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I. INTRODUCTION
In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,1 the U.S. Supreme Court
faced a challenge to a work product of collaboration. A New York poultry dealer
let customers select individual chickens for kosher slaughter from a coop or lot; he
was convicted of violating regulations adopted pursuant to the New Deal's Na-
2tional Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). The Court observed that the national
crisis of the Depression "demanded a broad and intensive co-operative effort by
those engaged in trade and industry, and that this necessary co-operation was
sought to be fostered by permitting them to initiate the adoption of codes." 3 How-
ever, the Court noted that this cooperation:
involves the coercive exercise of the lawmaking power. The codes of fair
competition which the statute attempts to authorize are codes of laws. If
valid, they place all persons within their reach under the obligation of
positive law, binding equally those who assent and those who do not as-
sent. Violations of the provisions of the codes are punishable as crimes..
1. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (affectionately known as the "Sick Chicken" case).
2. Id. at 521, 527-28.
3. Id. at 529.
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The Constitution provides that "All legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of
a Senate and House of Representatives." Art I, § 1. And the Congress is
authorized "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution" its general powers. Art. I, § 8, par. 18. The
Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential
legislative functions with which it is thus vested .... [W]e said that the
constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and
the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by
means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the au-
thority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.4
The statute in question expressly purported to "provide for the general wel-
fare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of co-operative
action among trade groups."5 The executive branch argued "that the codes will
consist of rules of competition deemed fair for each industry by representative
members of that industry-by the persons most vitally concerned and most famil-
iar with its problems."
6
The-Court, however, was unimpressed:
But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its leg-
islative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to em-
power them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the
rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or
industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that
purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the prob-
lems of their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid
by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in sec-
tion 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative
power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the consti-
tutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.7
The executive branch argued that there are constraints built into the statute
that render it a fair process for developing the codes. The President could not
approve codes as law unless he first found that the trade or industrial associations
or groups were truly representative and did not unfairly restrict membership.' The
President also had to ensure that the code was not designed to promote monopo-
lies or eliminate, oppress, or discriminate against small competitors. 9 The Court
rejected these protections as inadequate to address the delegation problem:
But these restrictions leave virtually untouched the field of policy envi-
saged by section 1 and, in that wide field of legislative possibilities, the
4. Id. at 529-30.
5. Id. at 531 n.9 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 537 (internal quotations omitted).
7. Id.
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proponents of a code, refraining from monopolistic designs, may roam at
will and the President may approve or disapprove their proposals as he
may see fit.' °
The Court found that the codes were a legislative undertaking, and that the
NIRA was without precedent because it supplied no standards and prescribed no
rules of conduct." Instead, it authorized codes but set no standards for them.
12
The Court concluded: "[T]he code-making authority thus conferred is an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power."' 3 Justice Cardozo famously concurred,
describing it as "delegation running iot.
' 'I4
The Supreme Court never overruled Schechter Poultry. Most of its rulings on
delegation do not return to the question of delegation to a non-governmental entity
or collaborative network of private sector actors. Instead, they examine the scope
of a statute's delegated authority to the executive branch.
15
Recently, the scholarship of administrative law has embraced self-regulation
and the so-called "new governance," including the use of policy tools that involve
privatization of previously public work and devolution of responsibility from
unitary bureaucracies to contractors. 16 Some have characterized the legal scholar-
ship of the new governance as a new form of legal realism, one that looks prag-
matically at law in context and in action; these legal scholars "seek[] to reinvent
governance from the 'bottom up' by rejecting ancient administrative strategies of
command and control and replacing them with a continuous dynamic process
governed by the relevant stakeholders."'
17
10. Id.
11. Id. at 541.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 542.
14. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
15. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v.
United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Pan. Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
16. The seminal works in public affairs are Lester M. Salamon & Odus V. Elliott, THE TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (2002), and Lester M. Salamon, The New Gover-
nance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001). See also
Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1999). A number of legal scholars have recently examined the new gover-
nance, which includes collaborative governance, in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89
MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and
in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004); Orly
Lobel, Surreply, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004);
Richard Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003);
Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for Healthcare, 2002
WIS. L. REV. 575 (2002) [hereinafter Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers]; Louise G. Trubek, New Go-
vernance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006) [hereinafter Trubek,
New Governance].
17. Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time for a New Legal Realism? 2005 WIs. L. REV. 335, 357 (2005)
(citing GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO
LITIGATION (2003); Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to
Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002); Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving
Equality: Healthcare Governance in Transition, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 395 (2003)).
[Vol. 2009
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The specific processes through which stakeholders participate attract less at-
tention among scholars. In practice, these include varieties of dialogue and deli-
beration with citizens and stakeholders, collaborative public management net-
works, and alternative or appropriate dispute resolution. These developments,
taken together, raise once again questions of transparency, accountability, and the
extent to which delegation adequately constrains administrative action within the
rule of law. Of course, some seventy years later, the Supreme Court is probably
not about to come down on our collective heads to punish collaboration. 18 How-
ever, public administrators have an ethical obligation to know and comply with
the Constitution and public law, 19 and where collaboration is concerned, the law is
either piecemeal or silent.
We need a comprehensive model to understand emerging uses of collabora-
tion across the policy continuum. We also need to re-examine our legal frame-
work for policy-making, implementation, and enforcement to encompass this new
collaborative governance. My normative assumption is that collaborative gover-
nance is useful in appropriate contexts if designed and implemented well. This
article describes the broad range of processes through which citizens and stake-
holders collaborate to make, implement, and enforce public policy. First, it briefly
reviews collaborative and new governance. Second, it describes deliberative de-
mocracy; collaborative public or network management; and appropriate dispute
resolution in the policy process. These three separate fields are part of a single
phenomenon, namely the changing nature of citizen and stakeholder voice in go-
vernance. Third, it describes how these new forms of participation operate across
the policy continuum. Fourth, it briefly reviews existing legal infrastructure for
collaborative governance primarily from the perspective of federal administrative
law.20 I conclude that we need to revise our legal infrastructure to facilitate colla-
boration in a way that will strengthen our democracy.
II. COLLABORATION IN GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT
During the final third of the twentieth century, the way that we talked about
both government and conflict evolved. So-called "wicked problems" such as
environmental degradation, urban economic development, and public health all
challenged the capacity of a single governmental unit operating in hierarchy.
Hierarchy's command and control management strategies failed in the face of
problems that could not be solved or solved easily by one entity acting alone.21
Moreover, hierarchy failed entirely as an approach to global and transnational
problems, i.e., those that cross the jurisdictional boundaries of nation states.
18. Professor Jody Freeman notes:
The arrangements that so disturbed the Supreme Court in the famous nondelegation cases are not
repeated in current collaborative efforts. In those cases, policy-making authority was delegated to
private interests that were not part of a balanced group, the government did not maintain an ac-
tive role in the process, and there were few, if any, procedural checks on the groups' conduct.
Freeman, supra note 16, at 90.
19. DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS 7 (2003).
20. This article can only survey selected developments, statutes, and issues; it is necessarily an
incomplete sketch.
21. See ROBERT AGRANOFF & MICHAEL MCGUIRE, COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: NEW
STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2, 24 (2003).
No. 2]
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This gave rise to the concept of governance, rather than government. 22 Go-
vernance suggests steering rather than top-down directing. In its contemporary
usage, it means a process involving resources and strategic, often collaborative,
relationships outside a single organization aimed toward achieving a public policy
goal. It may involve multiple organizations and stakeholders from public, private,
and nonprofit sectors that combine in a network to address a common and shared
problem. Certain manifestations of this phenomenon have come to be termed
"collaborative public management.' 23 Collaborative public management general-
ly relates to networks; it involves more than two parties in a bilateral contract.
Contracting out work is the subject of legal scholarship elsewhere; 24 however, the
notion of contract as a metaphor for the blurring of public and private is relevant
here.
25
Governance may also involve the public through civic engagement and parti-
cipatory decision-making; this is "participatory governance," which is the active
involvement of citizens in government decision-making 26 and may include deli-
berative democracy 27 and/or collaborative governance. 28 A principle of collabora-
tive, or shared, governance is that expert policy analysts do not have exclusive or
even the necessary information about public values and knowledge.29 Collabora-
22. See DONALD F. KETTL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA (2002); see also Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance:
A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2008) ("Once it was
dogma that our collective world was divided into two fundamentally different spheres: the public
sphere-which was the realm of governance, and the private sphere-the realm of the governed. This
crucial distinction has eroded. States do not enjoy a monopoly on governance, and themselves are
often governed by non-state actors.").
23. See generally AGRANOFF & McGUIRE, supra note 21; Rosemary O'Leary et al., Introduction to
the Symposium on Collaborative Public Management, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 6 (2006).
Collaborative public management is a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in
multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single
organizations. To collaborate means to co-labor to achieve common goals working across boundaries
in multi-sector relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity. Lisa Blomgren Bing-
ham et al., Frameshifting: Lateral Thinking for Collaborative Public Management, in BIG IDEAS IN
COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 3 (Lisa Blomgren Bingham & Rosemary O'Leary eds., 2008).
24. See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and Public
Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y I 11 (2006); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Priva-
tization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397 (2006).
25. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 571 (2000).
26. See generally DOUG HENTON ET AL., THE WILLIAM AND FLORA HEWLETT FOUNDATION,
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR GRANTMAKERS (2005), available at
http://www.hewlett.org/news/collaborative-governance-a-guide-for-grantmakers.
27. For a number of case studies and essays on deliberative democracy, see DEEPENING
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (Archon
Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003), and THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES
FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (John Gastil & Peter Levine
eds., 2005).
28. In addition, this article uses a definition for collaborative governance crafted by the Institute for
Local Government, a nonprofit research organization affiliated with the League of California Cities:
"Collaborative governance is a term used to describe the integration of reasoned discussions by the
citizens and other residents into the decision-making of public representatives, especially when these
approaches are embedded in the workings of local governance over time." Interview with Terry Ams-
ler, Program Director, Collaborative Governance Initiative, Inst. for Local Gov't, Sacramento, Cal.
(Nov. 28,2009).
29. See MArT LEIGHNINGER, THE NEXT FORM OF DEMOCRACY: HOW EXPERT RULE IS GIVING WAY
TO SHARED GOVERNANCE... AND WHY POLITICS WILL NEVER BE THE SAME 1-3 (2006).
[Vol. 2009
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tive governance may occur at any stage of the policy process, including identify-
ing an issue; identifying approaches to addressing it; identifying preferences; pri-
oritizing among preferences; selecting a policy approach; and adopting, imple-
menting, and enforcing policy.
30
The public administration literature distinguishes between collaborative pub-
lic management and collaborative governance. The literature falls into two cate-
gories: one that focuses on collaboration among organizations and a second that
grows out of more traditional notions of civic engagement and public participa-
tion. For the most part, neither of these literatures looks closely at the processes
for collaboration. More specifically, they tend to ignore the emergence of dispute
resolution and deliberative democracy as movements that relate to the evolution of
governance.
Administrative law scholars generally occupy themselves with challenges to
the legitimacy of the administrative state.3 1 The absence of any reference to ad-
ministrative agencies in the Constitution, the combination of quasi-legislative,
executive, and quasi-judicial functions in the agency potentially violating separa-
tion of powers, and the absence of direct accountability to the electorate taken
together raise concerns. As a result, most scholarship addresses how to con-
strain agency power and make it accountable, or conversely, to justify it.33 Scho-
lars have applied this approach to collaboration in governance, particularly regula-
tion-by-negotiation.
3 4
However, scholars recently have recognized an evolution away from com-
mand-and-control hierarchy to "a new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-
level, adaptive, problem-solving New Governance." 35 Professor Jody Freeman
examines the private role in public governance across the policy continuum, find-
ing that nongovernmental actors engage in legislative and adjudicative roles. 36
She argues that public-private interdependence is a reality best understood as a set
of negotiated relationships in which "public and private actors negotiate over poli-
30. See infra Part Ill.
31. See Freeman, supra note 25, at 543.
32. Id. at 545-46.
33. Among legal scholars, there is literature on contracting out and privatization of government
functions that identifies accountability as a concern. Professor Ellen Dannin explores new conceptions
of accountability in privatization, arguing that it is more than just value of services for the public
dollar, but should encompass civic values and participatory democracy. Dannin, supra note 24.
34. See, e.g., William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and
the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997); Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing
How to Regulate, 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 179 (2005).
35. Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 473. For a comprehensive review of the new governance literature
that Professor Karkkainen critiques, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 16. See also David L.
Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision Making Processes as a Way to
Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651 (2006); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclu-
sion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006); Trubek,
Public Interest Lawyers, supra note 16; David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Narrowing the Gap?
Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union: New Governance & Legal Regula-
tion: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539 (2007); Trubek, New
Governance, supra note 16; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2029 (2005).
36. Freeman, supra note 25, at 547. She includes among these corporations, public interest organiza-
tions, private standard setting bodies, professional associations, and nonprofit groups. Id. She does not
include citizens in their individual capacity. Id.
No. 2]
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cy making, implementation, and enforcement." 37 She ultimately rejects the term
governance in favor of "problems to confront and decisions to make," observing
"[there is nothing to govern." 38 She argues that administrative law must reorient
toward "facilitating the effectiveness of public/private regulatory regimes and
away from the traditional project of constraining agency discretion. 39 Important-
ly, she advocates institutional analysis and design, citing micro-institutional anal-
ysis as a promising marriage of critical legal studies and public choice approaches
that can help us better approach the practical problems of governance. 40 She ar-
gues that institutional design should move away from the traditional legislative,
executive, and judicial branches to an examination of alternative private institu-
tions and stakeholders and the role they can effectively play in governance.
41
Others have looked beyond the organized or institutional stakeholder to the
potential for citizens to participate more meaningfully in governance. For exam-
ple, Professor Lani Guinier argues for empowered third and fourth parties, propor-
tional representation, and ways to promote participation independent from politi-
cal structure and party system; in other words, she is advocating a new institution-
al design that promotes citizen self-organization and participation.42 She observes
that "[d]emocratic practices are those that value power-sharing, invite broad par-
ticipation, engage stakeholders in local decision-making about concrete problems,
and yield creative solutions that are nevertheless subject to critical feedback., 43
However, administrative law scholars are largely ignoring the mismatch be-
tween the existing statutory framework for governance and collaboration. Legis-
lators drafted the key federal and state statutes as legal infrastructure contemplat-
ing unilateral, command-and-control, hierarchical, and individual agency action.
The relevant statutes largely address only questions of process from the individual
agency perspective. 44 They are silent on the substantive work of agencies except
with regard to judicial review for ultra vires agency action. They are silent on the
structure of collaborative networks or other forms of collaborative public man-
agement. They may in places require public participation-for example notice
and comment in rulemaking or public hearings 45 -but they are largely silent as to
the wide variety of models for collaborative governance in agency policy-making.
This statutory framework represents part of the legal infrastructure for colla-
boration. The term legal infrastructure has been used to refer to a combined sys-
tem of constitutional, statutory, decisional, and administrative law, taken together
with the available institutional enforcement and support mechanisms. Its most
common use is in reference to efforts to develop the rule of law and viable protec-
tion of private property and investment in emerging democracies. State and fed-
eral legal infrastructure currently addresses two main categories of administrative
37. Id. at 548.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 549.
40. Id. at 674 (citing Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1411 (1996)).
41. Id.
42. See Lani Guinier, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 23 (2002).
43. Id. at 66.
44. See infra, Part IV.




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2009, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss2/2
Collaborative Governance
agency action: quasi-legislative processes for identifying policy problems, identi-
fying possible solutions, and choosing among them in formulating policy; and
quasi-judicial processes for implementing and enforcing policy.
Statutory approaches that provide legal infrastructure can either help or hind-
er collaboration. While these statutes authorize individual agencies to use a wide
variety of processes to engage citizens and stakeholders in the policy process,46
including a broader range of processes with the advent of dispute resolution and
negotiated rulemaking, they nevertheless do not explicitly address agencies acting
in the context of a collaborative network in partnership with other organizations,
the public, or stakeholders.
We need a more holistic view. The new governance is here to stay. Colla-
borative public management is growing; collaborative governance is a key way to
respond to some criticisms of networked and privatized government action. Pub-
lic law needs to provide a framework that authorizes collaborative management
and collaborative governance, facilitates broader and more effective use of colla-
boration, and preserves accountability to the rule of law and transparency in gov-
ernment.
LI. PUBLIC AND STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION
ALONG THE POLICY CONTINUUM
While the public sector has grappled with the evolution from government to
governance, civil society has experienced a parallel social phenomenon of groups
seeking to empower public and stakeholder voice in governance. This phenome-
non has taken three forms: (1) deliberative and participatory democracy; (2) colla-
borative public management; and (3) conflict resolution (alternative or appropriate
dispute resolution, or ADR).
A. Deliberative and Participatory Democracy
Deliberative democracy emerged during the past decade, and it is sufficiently
new that there is no consensus about what to name it. Terms include participatory
democracy, deliberation and dialogue, deliberative democracy, and, more broadly,
collaborative governance. This movement emerged in response to perceived fail-
ings in representative democracy with respect to conflict over public policy. Var-
ious manifestations of civil society (the nonprofit and voluntary sector and citizen
groups) have pressed for more public participation in the policy process.47 This
movement seeks more public deliberation, dialogue, and shared decision making
in governance 48 to address conflict at the broader level of public policy. It takes
advantage of new technologies for human communication and includes "e-
democracy" and "e-government." It has found support in the institutions of civil
46. See Lisa B. Bingham et al., The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and
Citizen Participation in the Work of Government, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547, 550-52 (2005).
47. See, e.g., JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER: ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATORY
PLANNING PROCESSES (1999); JOHN GASTIL, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND DELIBERATION
(2008).
48. THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 3-4; Nancy Roberts, Public
Deliberation in an Age of Direct Citizen Participation, 33 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 1, 1 (2003).
No. 2]
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society, to some degree from the same foundations that funded work on dispute
resolution,4 9 but usually under different funding programs more concerned with
healing the damage of war and ethnic conflict, and building democratic institu-
tions.
Central to each of the many evolving forms of participatory governance are
notions of dialogue and deliberation, 50 as contrasted with the traditional adversari-
al processes of governance, which usually entail debate. In dialogue, participants
engage in a reasoned exchange of viewpoints in an atmosphere of mutual respect
and civility, in a neutral space or forum, with an effort to reach a better mutual
understanding and sometimes even consensus. In debate, participants listen in an
effort to identify weaknesses in the argument and score points in an effective
counterargument; in deliberation and dialogue, participants listen in an effort to
better understand the other's viewpoint and identify questions or areas of confu-
sion to probe for a deeper understanding. Deliberation is the thoughtful consid-
eration of information, views, and ideas.
There are a variety of models and techniques including, but not limited to, the
21st Century Town Meeting, Appreciative Inquiry, Bohmian Dialogue, Citizen
ChoiceWork Dialogues, Citizens Juries, Compassionate Listening, Consensus
Conferences, Conversation Caf6, Deliberative Polling, Dynamic Facilitation and
the Wisdom Council, Future Search, Intergroup Dialogue, National Issues Fo-
rums, Nonviolent Communication, Online D&D, Open Space Technology, Public
Conversations Project, Study Circles, Sustained Dialogue, Wisdom Circles, and
World Caf6.5'
B. Collaborative Public or Network Management
The study of collaborative public management is an outgrowth of work in in-
tergovernmental relations, privatization, devolution, and nonprofit management.
52
It represents a shift in perspective; instead of viewing relations from the eyes of a
single public manager engaged in a linear series of contractual and partnership
arrangements, scholars of collaborative public management view the actors from a
distance in relation to each other.
49. These include the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. See discussion infra Part II.C.
50. LARS HASSELBLAD TORRES, THE WILLIAM AND FLORA HEWLE'I" FOUNDATION, DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY: A SURVEY OF THE FIELD (2003) (on file with author).
51. The Web site for the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation offers detailed definitions
for dialogue and deliberation, National Coalition for Dialogue & Deliberation,
http://www.thataway.org/?page-id=713 (last visited Dec. 15, 2009), and links to models and tech-
niques, National Coalition for Dialogue & Deliberation, http://www.thataway.org/?page-id=1487 (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009). For an effort at mapping the growing field and more description, see ABIGAIL
WILLIAMSON & ARCHON FUNG, MAPPING PUBLIC DELIBERATION (Feb. 14,2005) (unpublished report),
available at http://www.hewlett.org/download?guid=987261ed-49c2-102c-ab7e-0002b3e9a4de (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
52. See generally AGRANOFF & McGUIRE, supra note 21; ROBERT AGRANOFF, MANAGING WITHIN
NETWORKs: ADDING VALUE TO PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS (2007); EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING
AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP
(1999); BIG IDEAS IN COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 23; THE COLLABORATIVE
PUBLIC MANAGER (Rosemary O'Leary & Lisa Blomgren Bingham eds., 2008).
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Public administration scholars distinguish among cooperation, coordination,
and collaboration.53 Cooperation is the absence of conflict; it is less formal, in-
volves sharing information, may be short term, and presents little risk.5 4 Coordi-
nation is the orchestration of people toward a particular goal; it involves more
formal and longer-term interaction, increased risk, and shared rewards. Collabo-
ration, however, suggests a closer relationship; it suggests that participants "co-
labor." It entails a new structure, shared resources, defined relationships, and
communication. Collaboration also involves creating, enhancing, and building on
social and organizational capital in pursuit of shared purposes.
1. Varieties of Collaborative Public Management
Collaboration varies along a number of dimensions. It occurs within and
across organizations. A single organization may have multiple districts, units, or
offices that need to collaborate, e.g., various extension offices of a university with
multiple campuses. It occurs within and across sectors. There are networks of
agencies; for example, federal agencies coordinate on environmental conflict reso-
lution and across the government on ADR. 55 It also occurs between both homo-
geneous and diverse partners. Environmental groups may form a coalition among
themselves, yet in a collaborative effort, they may work with putative private sec-
tor polluters; conflicting local, regional, state, and federal government agencies;
and concerned citizen groups.
Collaboration occurs among those with shared and different goals. It does not
nullify competition, and paradoxically it may yield conflict. For example, higher
education may band together to develop an alternative to the U.S. News & World
56Reports ranking formula. However, each institution may seek to best the other
in the quest for top applicants, and schools will still compete against each other
for advances in reputation.
Collaboration also occurs when it is mandatory as well as when it is emergent
or voluntary. States vary in mandating collaboration regarding community efforts
to serve children and families. 57 Some states mandate which agencies have to
participate, while other states set goals with proportions of members representing
certain categories. Still other states use an open-ended approach, allowing the
networks to self-organize.58
Collaboration has been occurring in planning and environmental settings for
three decades. In land use, for example, fifty-nine different municipal authorities
collaborated in Hamilton County, Ohio, to develop a plan for growth and devel-
53. John M. Bryson & Barbara C. Crosby, Failing into Cross-Sector Collaboration Successfully, in
BIG IDEAS IN COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 55-57.
54. MICHAEL WINER & KAREN RAY WINER, COLLABORATION HANDBOOK: CREATING,
SUSTAINING, AND ENJOYING THE JOURNEY 22 (1994).
55. See Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group, http://www.adr.gov/ (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
56. For examples of the U.S. News rankings, see http://www.usnews.com/sections/rankings/ (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
57. Stephen Page, Managing for Results Across Agencies: Building Collaborative Capacity in the
Human Services, in BIG IDEAS IN COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 138-161.
58. Id. at 144.
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opment; they reached unanimous agreement on its outlines.59 In the Florida Ever-
glades, stakeholders collaborated to resolve a conflict over the science of restoring
the watershed and how to foster and measure progress.
60
Collaboration occurs on highly contentious issues and on less controversial
ones. The field of environmental conflict resolution is a testament to the use of
collaboration on highly contentious issues such as natural resource allocation and
development; cleanup of water, land, or air; and land use.6 1 Collaboration occurs
with large and small numbers of actors. RESOLVE, a nonprofit mediation servic-
es organization, documents mediated collaboration on a variety of policy issues
with dozens of participants.
62
Moreover, collaboration occurs with and without professional facilitators or
mediators. Facilitated or mediated collaboration has occurred at highly polluted
sites involving local, regional, state, and federal government; Native American
tribes; nonprofit organizations; environmental advocacy groups; and groups of
local residents since the 1970s.63 It has also occurred in food safety, HIV/AIDS
treatment, urban air quality, and dam decommissioning. 64 In watershed manage-
ment, some groups use professionals while others instead designate one member
to chair meetings.
65
In lower conflict settings, regional voluntary service coordination and colla-
boration may emerge voluntarily among local governments. 66 Local neighbor-
hood councils collaborate with city service agencies to enhance communication
and responsiveness. 67 The Policy Consensus Initiative documents how the state of
Maryland collaborated with Wicomico County to develop better ways to coordi-
nate the delivery of human services.
68
59. AmericaSpeaks, Hamilton County Community COMPASS, http://www.americaspeaks.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&PagelD=568&d:\CFusionMX7\verity\Data\dummy.txt (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
60. See CARLOS ALVAREZ ET AL., U.S. INST. FOR ENVTL. CONFLICT RESOLUTION, ASSESSMENT OF
OPPORTUNITIES FOR MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION 6 (2002), available at
http://www.ecr.gov/pdf/everglades-final_report.pdf. See generally U.S. Institute for Environmental
Conflict Resolution, http://www.ecr.gov/Default.aspx (last visited June 18, 2009).
61. See generally THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
(Rosemary O'Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003).
62. See RESOLVE, Online Case Gallery, http://www.resolv.org/experience/cases/exhibit all.html
(last visited Dec. 15, 2009). RESOLVE is a nonprofit organization that provides mediation and facili-
tation services in environmental and public policy conflict. RESOLVE, Results Through Consensus,
http://www.resolv.org/index.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
63. See RESOLVE, Our Experience, http://www.resolv.org/experience/index.html (last visited Dec.
15, 2009); RESOLVE, Gallery of Case Studies, supra note 62.
64. See RESOLVE, Gallery of Case Studies, supra note 62.
65. William Leach & Paul Sabatier, Facilitators, Coordinators, and Outcomes, in THE PROMISE
AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 61, at 148, 148-71.
66. Richard C. Feiock, Institutional Collective Action and Local Government Collaboration, in BIG
IDEAS IN COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 195-2 10.
67. Terry L. Cooper et al., Citizen-Centered Collaborative Public Management, 66 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 76, 79 (2006) [hereinafter Cooper et al., Citizen-Centered]; Terry L. Cooper et al., Outcomes
Achieved Through Citizen-Centered Collaborative Public Management, in BIG IDEAS IN
COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 211-229.
68. Policy Consensus Initiative & Nat'l Policy Consensus Ctr., Case Studies Database-Human
Services Cases, http://www.policyconsensus.org/casestudies/humanservices.html (last visited Dec. 15,
2009); see also Consensus Initiative & Nat'l Policy Consensus Cir., Human Services: Building Con-
sensus on Human Services Reform in Maryland 3, http://www.policyconsensus.org/casestudies/docs/
MD reform.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
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Collaboration also occurs with and without public participation. Emergency
management planning in New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina involved repre-
sentatives of local, state, and federal government and was largely limited to pro-
fessionals. 69 This engendered substantial criticism. 7° Planning for the recovery
now involves collaboration of local, state, and federal agencies and a series of
large scale, high-profile citizen forums and participation by elected officials.
71
These are just a few examples of the wide variation of collaborative networks in
practice.
2. Authorities for and Constraints on Collaborative Public Management
Law may operate to facilitate or constrain collaboration in networks. One
study shows that networks with express legislative authorization or charters are
more likely to take action rather than simply share information. 72 Statutes may
lower the barriers to collaboration, for example, by authorizing public agencies to
do anything together that they have power to do apart.73  When experiments in
collaboration are successful, states may then mandate collaboration as the pre-
ferred method to implement public policy. 74 States have enacted mandates for
accountability and managing for results in collaboration. 75 Legal mandates may
provide collaborative public management networks with legitimacy that facilitates
their work implementing policy.
76
Law is an independent variable that is cropping up, creating incentives, bar-
riers, or obstacles to collaborative public management; yet the nature of individual
statutory provisions has not been systematically examined in legal or public ad-
ministration scholarship. This article is only a first step in identifying this issue; it
remains for future work to canvas the relevant legal authority.
69. John J. Kiefer & Robert S. Montjoy, Incrementalism before the Storm: Network Performance for
the Evacuation of New Orleans, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 122, 124-26 (2006) (describing how state and
local officials formulated the plan and how exercises were confined to professionals).
70. For an analysis, see a case study by AmericaSpeaks, Unified New Orleans Plan,
http://www.americaspeaks.org (follow "Projects" hyperlink; then follow "Case Studies" hyperlink;
then follow "Unified New Orleans Plan" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
7 1. This process, organized with the assistance of AmericaSpeaks, is described in more detail at The
Unified New Orleans Plan, The Plan Defined, http://www.unifiedneworleansplan.com/home3/
section/130/the-plan-defined (last visited Dec. 15, 2009), and AmericaSpeaks, Unified New Orleans
Plan, http://www.americaspeaks.org (follow "Projects" hyperlink; then follow "Case Studies" hyper-
link; then follow "Unified New Orleans Plan" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
72. AGRANOFF,supra note 52, at 189-220.
73. Richard C. Feiock, Institutional Collective Action and Local Government Collaboration, in BIG
IDEAS IN COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 195-210.
74. Jay Ryu, Ohio Univ., & Hal Rainey, Univ. of Ga., Organizational Design and Program Perfor-
mance: One-Stop Shopping Structures in Employment Training Programs, Presentation at the 2006
Collaborative Public Management Conference: Maxwell School Program on the Analysis and Resolu-
tion of Conflict (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edulparc/AAA%20-
%20PowerpointslHal%20Rainey.ppt (discussing emergent public management networks that form
around one-stop employment centers, which are later mandated by the state legislature).
75. Stephen Page, supra note 57, at 138-61.
76. Keith G. Provan et al., Legitimacy Building in Organizational Networks, in BIG IDEAS IN
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C. Conflict Resolution: The ADR Movement
Government institutions and authority were not sufficient to cope with waves
of domestic conflict after World War II. Various new institutions evolved outside
government to meet this need, including a mature system for collective bargain-
ing. The ADR movement emerged in large part from private justice systems in
labor relations when philanthropies subsidized experiments applying these
processes in new contexts, such as community and neighborhood conflict.
77
These processes include negotiation (preferably interest-based and collaborative
78rather than positional and competitive bargaining), mediation (negotiation with
the help of a third party with no decision-making power), 79 and arbitration (private
judging).8 °
These processes are not new; they exist informally in every culture through-
out recorded history, for example, through the work of village elders and religious
leaders. What evolved after 1960 was the notion of institutionalizing these
processes either outside government or in relation to it as civil society's way of
enhancing community, its problem-solving capacity, social capital, and justice.
When used in response to an existing conflict involving specific disputants, this
movement became known as alternative dispute resolution. Some now call it
"appropriate" dispute resolution, in response to criticism that: (1) ADR exists
independently from the justice system and is thus not "alternative" in all cases; 81
and (2) that the traditional civil justice system is intended to resolve disputes. 82
The ADR movement gave rise to community mediation centers funded in part
by the U.S. Department of Justice to address social unrest during the 1960s.
8 3
77. JEROME T. BARRETr WITH JOSEPH BARRETr, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL MOVEMENT 148-157 (2004).
78. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GE'rING TO YES (2d ed. 1991).
79. For a detailed description of the mediation process and examples, see CHRISTOPHER MOORE,
THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (3d ed. 2003). For an
alternative model of practice, transformative mediation, see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH
FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT (rev. ed.
2005). As to labor and employment uses, see JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (1997).
80. Arbitration has a long history of use for disputes in labor relations and business in the private
sector. The classic treatise on labor arbitration is ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS
(Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003). For a discussion of arbitration in dispute-system designs involv-
ing employment disputes, see DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING
WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS (2003). On commercial arbitration, see THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH &
PETER H. KASKELL, CPR COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT
ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS (2000).
81. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic De-
fense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2689 (1995).
82. For example, Janet Reno, a strong advocate of ADR, explained: "At the Department of Justice, I
took steps two years ago, to make the use of what I call, not alternative dispute resolution, but appro-
priate dispute resolution, a reality. I use appropriate dispute resolution, because sometimes a trial is by
far and away the most appropriate method." Janet Reno, U.S. Att'y Gen., Address Before the Ameri-
can Judicature Society 8 (Feb. 5, 1998) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
archive/ag/speeches/1998/0205_ag__cgo.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009)).
83. See Timothy Hedeen, The Evolution and Evaluation of Community Mediation: Limited Research
Suggests Unlimited Progress, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 101, 102-04 (2004); Nat'l Ass'n for Cmty.
Mediation, About Community Mediation, http://www.nafcm.org/pg5.cfm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
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During the 1970s and 1980s, the business community adopted ADR to reduce
transaction costs in addressing conflict in commercial dealings. 84 During the
1990s, ADR became institutionalized in many judicial systems, including both
state 85 and federal courts86 in the United States, and increasingly in Europe 87 and
other developed economies such as Australia. 88 During the past decade, ADR
became institutionalized in U.S. federal agencies.89
Civil society contributed to dissemination of these processes in a variety of
ways. What follows are a few examples but by no means a complete account. In
the United States, beginning in the 1960s, philanthropic institutions such as the
Ford, Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Hewlett Foundations, among others, funded the
movement. Hewlett's contribution was central to the development of ADR in the
United States.90 In Europe and the states made newly independent by the end of
the Cold War in the 1990s, these same philanthropies, together with the European
Union,9 1 the American Bar Association and its Foundation,92 the Soros Founda-
tion,93 the World Bank,94 and the USAID,95 among others, funded various training
84. See Am. Arbitration Assoc., www.adr.org (last visited Dec. 15, 2009); Int'l Inst. for Conflict
Prevention and Disp. Resol., www.cpradr.org (last visited Dec. 15, 2009) (formerly known as the CPR
Institute).
85. See Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Alternative Dispute Resolution InfoCenter,
http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/CourTopics/ResourceCenter.asp?id=2 (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
86. See Fed. Judicial Ctr, Inside the Federal Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/
autoframe!openform&nav=menul&page=/federal/courts.nsflpage/293 (last visited Dec. 15, 2009)
(describing types of ADR procedures used in federal courts after the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1998).
87. See, e.g., Nadja Alexander, Global Trends in Mediation: Riding the Third Wave, in GLOBAL
TRENDS IN MEDIATION 1, 8 (Nadja Alexander ed., 2003); see also Eur. Comm'n, European Judicial
Network: Alternative Dispute Resolutions-General Information, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/
adrgenen.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
88. Tania Sourdin, Mediation in Australia: The Decline of Litigation?, in GLOBAL TRENDS IN
MEDIATION, supra note 87, at 33, 34.
89. JEFFREY M. SENGER, FEDERAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: USING ADR WITH THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT 14-16 (2003); Lisa B. Bingham & Charles R. Wise, The Administrative Dispute Resolu-
tion Act of 1990: How Do We Evaluate its Success?, 6 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 383, 392-96
(1996); see also Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group, http://www.adr.gov (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
90. For the history of this program see DAVID KovICK, THE HEWLETT FOUNDATION'S CONFLICT
RESOLUTION PROGRAM: TWENTY YEARS OF FIELD-BUILDING 1984-2004 (2005), available at
http://www.hewlett.orgldownload?guid=674b602c-49ce-102c-ab7e-0002b3e9a4de (last visited Dec.
15, 2009). For explanatory monographs on the full spectrum of its work, see HENTON ET AL., supra
note 26; ROSEMARY O'LEARY Er AL., THE WILLIAM AND FLORA HEWLETT FOUNDATION,
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL GRANTMAKERS (2005),
available at http://www.hewlett.org/download?guid=d4f60a08-49be-102c-ab7e-0002b3e9a4de (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009). For a summary of research gaps Hewlett identified upon completion of its
funding program, see Robert A. Baruch Bush & Lisa B. Bingham, Knowledge Gaps: The Final Confe-
rence of the Hewlett ADR Theory Centers, 23 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 99-122 (2005).
91. See ADR MEDA, MEDA Programme, http://www.adrmeda.org/meda -programme.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009) (Web site of the European Commission-sponsored project "Promotion of Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration and Other Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in MEDA
Countries").
92. See ABA, Rule of Law Initiative, http://www.abanet.org/rol/europe-andeurasia/ (last visited
Dec. 15, 2009) (describing the Europe and Eurasia Program).
93. See Open Society Institute & Soros Foundations Network, http://www.soros.org/initiatives (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
94. See The World Bank, Law & Justice Insitutions-Alternative Dispute Resolution,
http://go.worldbank.org/FIDHSHUEJO (last visited Dec. 15, 2009); The World Bank, WBI Gover-
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and efforts at program development to strengthen the rule of law. Similar projects
have recently been undertaken in China and other parts of Asia by the Asia Foun-
96dation. In addition, there have been numerous independent initiatives and ex-
changes across national boundaries through institutions of higher education-
primarily law schools-for example, regarding the training of judges in South and
Central America, Eastern Europe, the newly independent states, and Asia.
97
Common ADR processes for public conflict resolution 98 may include negotia-
tion, 99 which is considered a form of ADR because it is different from traditional
competitive bargaining and is the foundation for all the other processes except
arbitration. l ° Conciliation is a term used when an agency attempts to negotiate a
private settlement between two or more parties to a dispute subject to the agency's
jurisdiction.0 1 This term historically also referred to mediation in the context of
labor relations and collective bargaining, as in the Federal Mediation and Concili-
ation Service (FMCS). 10 Facilitation is widely used in environmental conflict
resolution.' ° 3 This process is more commonly used in multi-party issues or for
nance & Anti-Corruption-Programs, http://go.worldbank.org/CMW4R42070 (last visited Dec. 15,
2009).
95. See U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., USAID Europe and Eurasia: USAID, ABA/CEELI Provides
Legal Aid to Thousands, http://www.usaid.govlocations/europeeurasia/press/success/2006-12-
24.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
96. See The Asia Foundation: Programs, http://asiafoundation.org/program/ (last visited Dec. 15,
2009).
97. See, e.g., Univ. of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Institute for Development of Legal
Infrastructure http://www.mcgeorge.edu/x129.xml (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
98. For a basic overview, see Lisa B. Bingham, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Public Adminis-
tration, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 546, 546-66 (Phillip J. Cooper & Ches-
ter A. Newland eds., 1997).
99. Principled or interest-based negotiation (also called collaborative problem solving) is sometimes
considered a form of dispute resolution. Disputants negotiate directly and attempt to untangle interper-
sonal and substantive issues, focus on interests rather than rights or positions, promote creative prob-
lem solving, and use principles rather than power to reach agreement. FISHER ET AL., supra note 78, at
10-11. For a comprehensive review of the negotiation literature, see ROY J. LEWICKI ET AL.,
NEGOTIATION (5th ed. 2005). For a summary of principled negotiation applied to collaborative net-
works and a bibliography, see ROSEMARY O'LEARY & LISA BLOMGREN BINGHAM, IBM CTR. FOR THE
BUS. OF GOV'T, A MANAGER'S GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS
(2007), available at http://www.businessofgovemment.org/pdfs/OlearyBinghamReport.pdf.
100. For an example of how the executive branch has encouraged the use of principled negotiation
and collaborative problem solving in governance, see OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET AND
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/adr/pdf/ombceqjointstmt.pdf.
101. For example, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (commonly known as Title VII) mandates concilia-
tion for disputes regarding discrimination in employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(4) (2006) (pro-
viding that the EEOC may "upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees or some of them,
or (ii) any labor organization, whose members or some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to coope-
rate in effectuating the provisions of this subchapter .... assist in such effectuation by conciliation or
such other remedial action as is provided by this subchapter" (emphasis added)).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 172 (2006) (creating the FMCS and empowering it to provide mediation and concil-
iation services).
103. See, e.g., William Leach & Paul Sabatier, Facilitators, Coordinators, and Outcomes, in THE
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 148-71 (Rosemary
O'Leary & Lisa Blomgren Bingham eds., 2003) (reporting on the use of facilitators in a study evaluat-
ing their effectiveness in watershed management, a form of environmental conflict resolution). A
facilitator structures group discussions toward a voluntary settlement, asking questions and using
collaborative problem-solving techniques. For a detailed explanation of the process and examples, see
ROGER SCHWARZ, THE SKILLED FACILITATOR: A COMPREHENSIVE RESOURCE FOR CONSULTANTS,
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large groups'l 4 and is considered less interventionist than mediation. Mediation is
the most widely used process in the federal government.'0 5 This process is also
widely used in environmental and public policy conflict resolution. 1°6 These
processes all involve developing consensus-based solutions.
However, dispute resolution also includes decision-based processes. Fact-
finding is a form of advisory arbitration where a third-party neutral conducts an
informal evidentiary hearing to narrow disputed facts. Mini-trials are a form of
advisory arbitration where a neutral party conducts a more formal but still abbre-
viated evidentiary hearing and advises on disputed questions of law. Arbitration is
private adjudication or private judging.'0 7 Dispute resolution includes not only
processes but also programs that give participants choices among a variety of
processes. For example, ombudsperson programs use an in-house third-party
neutral to assist people in handling conflict. 10 8 Properly structured, these pro-
grams may contribute to systemic change.'°9
There is substantial research on these processes in the fields of social psy-
chology, organizational behavior, political science, economics, planning, commu-
nications, education, labor, and industrial relations, among other fields. 110  One
leading theory is that of procedural justice, which suggests that people will judge
the outcome of a dispute process to be fair if they judge the process for reaching
FACILITATORS, MANAGERS, TRAINERS, AND COACHES (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter SCHWARZ, THE
SKILLED FACILITATOR] and ROGER SCHWARZ ET AL., THE SKILLED FACILITATOR FIELDBOOK: TIPS,
TOOLS, AND TESTED METHODS FOR CONSULTANTS, FACILITATORS, MANAGERS, TRAINERS, AND
COACHES (2005).
104. SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR PROFESSIONALS IN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND CITIZENS' GROUPS 107 (2d ed. 2001).
105. See Bingham & Wise, supra note 89. Mediation is assisted negotiation, in which a third-party
neutral attempts to help parties reach a mutual agreement. Sometimes the mediator uses shuttle diplo-
macy, in which the parties will separately, and mostly in confidence, communicate their interests,
goals, and concerns. The mediator identifies a range of possible settlements, but has no power to im-
pose a solution or decide the case. See generally, BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 79; MOORE, supra note
79.
106. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 136-84 (1987); Mich~le Firenz, Introduction to the
Cases and Commentaries, in THE CONSENSUS-BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
REACHING AGREEMENT 679,679-82 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
107. Generally, a third-party neutral conducts an informal hearing on disputed issues of fact and/or
law and renders an award or decision. This process may be voluntary or mandatory, and may be advi-
sory or binding. See generally, ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 80. For discussions of adhesive
arbitration that create arbitration agreements as a condition of employment or entering into a consumer
transaction, see Symposium, Mandatory Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2004.
Sometimes arbitration is imposed by law, as in the case of the Amateur Sports Act mandating arbitra-
tion for disputes regarding issues arising in Olympic sports competition. See 36 U.S.C. § 220529
(2006).
108. The ombuds can help refer employees or citizens to the appropriate dispute resolution process,
can engage in conflict coaching, and can help manage the variety of agency processes. For a wealth of
resources and standards of practice, see The International Ombudsman Association,
http://www.ombudsassociation.org (last visited June 18, 2009).
109. See Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP.
RESOL. 1.
110. See generally, THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Morton
Deutsch et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006). For review articles on field studies and evaluation of the uses of
mediation in the contexts of employment, education, criminal justice, the environment, family dis-
putes, civil litigation in courts, and community disputes, see Conflict Resolution in the Field: Assessing
the Past, Charting the Future, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2004).
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that outcome to be fair and if they are given opportunities for voice and respectful
treatment."' Researchers have also identified interactional and interpersonal jus-
tice as frames for understanding disputant preferences for dispute resolution
processes.' 2
IV. GOVERNANCE AND THE POLICY PROCESS
Together, these developments have begun to change the policy process at
every jurisdictional level, whether local, regional, state, national, transnational, or
global. At its most general, the policy process consists of stages in a continuous
and dynamic system. The following stages assume a division among legislative,
executive, and judicial powers. u 3 The stages include identifying approaches or
tools for solving the policy problem," 14 setting priorities among these, selecting
from among the priorities, drafting proposed legislation, enacting legislation, iden-
tifying policy problems left for the executive to resolve within the boundaries of
the legislation, identifying approaches or tools for regulations, setting priorities for
these, selecting from among them, drafting proposed regulations, enacting regula-
tions, implementing regulations (through project or program management, per-
mits), enforcing legislation and regulations through executive power adjudication,
and enforcing these through litigation within the jurisdiction of the judicial power.
It is arbitrary to begin at any one point because the system is continuous and
dynamic. For example, a national court may decide a controversial case that
prompts a wave of legislation. The legislature may adopt a law that ends up in
court. However, it is conventional to begin with identifying a policy problem.
Figure 1 summarizes this framework in a linear format.
111. See E. ALLAN LIND & THOMAS R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICe
64 (1988).
112. For a review of recent literature, see Tina Nabatchi et al., Organizational Justice and Workplace
Mediation: A Six-Factor Model, 18 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 148 (2007).
113. I use the term "power" rather than "branch" because in some nations, multiple powers are com-
bined in a single branch of government. This discussion is framed largely in terms of the domestic
context of the United States, but it could as easily map processes in other national contexts or transna-
tionally.
114. See generally, THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester Sala-
mon ed., 2002). For a discussion of the analysis and selection of policy instruments, see B. Guy Peters,
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Figure 1. The Policy Continuum
Upstream - Midstream Downstream
Legislative Implementing Quasi-judicial
Quasi-legislative Policy Enforcing Policy







1. Identifying a Policy Problem
2. Identifying Approaches for
Solving the Policy Problem
3. Setting Priorities Among
Approaches
4. Selecting from Among the
Priorities
5. Drafting Proposed Legislation
6. Enacting Legislation
7. Identifying Policy Problems for
the Executive Power to Resolve
within the Boundaries of the
Legislation
8. Identifying Approaches or Tools
for Regulations
9. Setting Priorities for
Regulations
10. Selecting from Among
Priorities for Regulations
11. Drafting Proposed Regulations
12. Enacting Regulations
13. Implementing Regulations
14. Enforcing Legislation and
Regulations through
Executive Powers
15. Enforcing Legislation and
Regulations through
Judicial Power
Conflict can and will occur at each of these stages. One helpful metaphor is
the flowing stream. 115 There is no fixed boundary for each of these stages on the
policy continuum. Upstream includes the earliest stages in the policy process up
to the point of implementation; these are either legislative or quasi-legislative in
nature. 16 After legislation is enacted, agencies engage in quasi-legislative action
aimed at filling in the details and establishing general standards of behavior for
prospective or future application. Traditionally, this upstream action entails li-
mited public participation through, for example, committee testimony, written
comment, or speaking briefly at public hearings.
However, new forms of participatory governance are increasingly used up-
stream in the policy process; we need to re-examine the legal framework within
which public agencies do this work. These new forms include deliberative de-
mocracy, e-democracy, public conversations, participatory budgeting, citizen
juries, study circles, collaborative policy-making, and other forms of deliberation
and dialogue among groups of stakeholders or citizens." 7 They also include focus
groups, roundtables, deliberative town meeting forums, choice work dialogues,
115. THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 61,
at 23.
116. Bingham et al., supra note 46, at 551-54.
117. DEEPENING DEMOCRACY, supra note 27, at 3-42; David E. Booher, Collaborative Governance
Practices and Democracy, 93 NAT'L Civic REV. 32, 34-41 (2004); TORRES, supra note 50; Abby
Williamson and Archon Fung, Public Deliberation: Where are We and Where Can We Go?, 93 NAT'L






Bingham: Bingham: Collaborative Governance
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
national issues forums, cooperative management bodies, and other partnership
arrangements. The underlying theory is that these processes promote a more civil
public discourse and more collaborative and deliberative policy-making among
citizens.
Using the framework of the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolu-
tion (USIECR), 1 8 midstream stages in the policy process include rulemaking,
implementation, and program development. These are both quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial.11 9 An agency may use negotiated rulemaking to draft proposed
regulations.' The agency may need to craft a permit for a particular land use or
development. In this case, implementation through permitting or licensing both
sets future standards and involves defined actors with a specific history of past
behaviors (for example, organizations emitting pollutants). 1  However, we again
see increasing use of new ways to engage the public in this stage of the policy
process. For example, the agency might use consensus policy-making or media-
tion to reach consensus on the permit terms. There are also collaborative public
management networks that cooperate to implement policy.1 22 Thus, I argue that
we now find a mix of participatory governance and ADR processes used mid-
stream.
Downstream stages in the policy process are quasi-judicial or judicial, al-
though these are broad overgeneralizations. Judicial and quasi-judicial action are
aimed at determining rights and responsibilities among a defined set of actors
based on past events. Traditionally, these processes include formal and informal
adjudication and informal agency action resulting in an order. However, we now
find widespread agency uses of ADR, including mediation, facilitation, early neu-
tral assessment, and arbitration. Generally, ADR-and not deliberative or partici-
patory democracy-is associated with these stages of the policy process. Figure 2
summarizes this array of processes.
118. See U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resol., Types of ECR Processes, http://www.ecr.gov/
Basics/SampleProcessOutline.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
119. Lisa B. Bingham et al., supra note 46, at 552-54.
120. Negotiated rulemaking has been in use since the 1980s and has support in law. See Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1627-29 (1986); Lawrence Suss-
kind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133,
140-44 (1985).
121. Freeman, supra note 16, at 55-66 (describing cases of negotiated permits for industrial dis-
charges into air and water).
122. Allyson Barker et al., The Role of Collaborative Groups in Federal Land and Resource Man-
agement: A Legal Analysis, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 67, 67 (2003) (observing that "'colla-
borative groups' are coalitions of interested parties affected by land-use policies, organized to develop
and present a consensual resource management plan to the relevant federal agency").
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Figure 2. Process on the Policy Continuum
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The problem with the traditional account of the policy process is that it is
usually understood to refer to a single sovereign actor with legal jurisdiction over
certain substantive policy arenas pursuant to a defined delegation of authority.
However, governance entails activity among multiple actors with potentially over-
lapping jurisdiction. ADR has a well-established history in which agencies have
used it to address complex disputes involving multiple actors, sectors, and levels
of government. This is also true to a lesser extent for collaborative public man-
agement, but it is not true of deliberative and participatory democracy.
In sum, we have arrived at a point in the relationship between government
and private, nonprofit, or citizen actors where we have a multitude of new modes
for interaction in the policy process. We have different names for many ways of
engaging citizens and stakeholders across the policy continuum, but we have not
arrived at a comprehensive understanding of how these relate to each other or to
the existing legal framework for governance. In order to illustrate this develop-
ment in more detail, the following section breaks up the policy process into fifteen
steps, with examples of how various processes are loosely arrayed from upstream
to downstream along the policy process. The discussion combines illustrations
from local, regional, state, and national government action. Table I summarizes
these illustrations along the array.
No. 21
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Table 1. Abbreviated Taxonomy of Participation Processes in Governance
Policy Stage: Participation Inclusiveness: Existing U.S. Collaborative
From Inception of Process: Broader Legal Public
Legislation through Deliberation and Upstream, Infrastructure for Management:
Agency Action to Dialogue Upstream Narrower Participation: Mostly Up- andJudicial Branch Conflict Resolution Downstream Less Upstream, Mid-StreamEnforcement Downstream More
Downstream

















2. Identifying Citizen Juries, Targeted sample
Approaches for Denmark Targeted sample
Solving the Policy Study Circles
Problem
3. Setting Priorities AmericaSpeaks 21st Open invitation State sunshine Municipal uses
Among Approaches Century Town and laws among local
Meetings representative Federal FOIA agencies and
Deliberative Polling sample nonprofits
National Issues Random sample
Forum Open invitation
4. Selecting from Policy Dialogues Targeted sample State sunshine Municipal uses
Among the Priorities Policy Consensus Targeted sample laws
ChoiceWorks Open invitation Federal FOIA
Dialogues Open invitation
AmericaSpeaks 21 st and
Century Town representative
Meetings sample
Deliberative Polling Random sample
National Issues Open invitation
Forum
5. Drafting Proposed AmericaSpeaks: Open invitation State and federal
Legislation: Local, Americans Discuss and constitutions
state, or federal Social Security representative Municipal charter
sample State home rule
laws
6. Enacting Direct and All citizens State and federal
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8. Identifying Policy dialogues Selected State and federal Local, state, and
Approaches or Tools Policy consensus stakeholders sunshine laws regional uses
for Regulations Study Circles Selected Federal Advisory
Citizen Juries stakeholders Committee Act
Planning Cells Representative State equivalents
sample of
citizens
9. Setting Priorities for Policy dialogues Targeted sample State and federal Local, state, and
Regulations Policy consensus Targeted sample sunshine laws regional uses
ChoiceWorks Dialo- Open invitation Federal Advisory Federal uses
gues Random sample Committee Act through
Deliberative Polling Open invitation and state Negotiated






A. Upstream in the Policy Process-Legislative and Quasi-legislative Uses
of Dialogue and Deliberation
Processes for resolving conflict in policy-making vary along several dimen-
sions, including the participants, their authority and power to influence policy
decisions, and the process for communication and decision-making. 123 Professor
Archon Fung suggests that categories of participants include the diffuse public
sphere, open self-selection, open targeted recruiting, random selection, lay stake-
holders, professional stakeholders, elected representatives, and expert administra-
tors. 12 4 He proposes that types of authority include personal benefits, communica-
tive influence, advise and consult, co-governance, and direct authority.1l 5 Lastly,
he identifies six modes of communication and decision-making processes: partic-
ipants listen as spectators, express preferences, develop preferences, aggregate and
bargain, deliberate and negotiate, and deploy technique and expertise. 126  Using
these three dimensions, he creates a "democracy cube," on which he maps differ-
ent processes. 
127
Others have described different levels of public participation. Sherry
Arnstein's "ladder of participation" ranges from manipulation of the public and
therapy at the low end--through levels including informing, consultation, and
placation in the middle--to partnership, delegated power, and citizen control on
the upper steps of the ladder. 128 The International Association for Public Partici-
pation (IAP2) has a "spectrum of participation" in which agencies have the choice
to inform, consult, involve, collaborate, or empower the public. 129 Each form of
123. Archon Fung, Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 66
(2006).
124. !d. at 67-68.
125. Id. at 69.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 70-72.
128. Sherry Amstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
PLANNERS 216, 217-218 (1969).




Bingham: Bingham: Collaborative Governance
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
public participation has an implicit promise to the public, ranging from keeping
the public informed to implementing what the public decides.
130
Other commentators have suggested that the quality of these processes de-
pends upon how well they satisfy three criteria: inclusiveness, deliberativeness,
and influence. 131 Inclusiveness is the quality of getting a broadly representative
portion of the relevant community to participate; deliberativeness has to do with
the quality of dialogue, information exchanged, and civility of the conversation
among participants and decision-makers; and influence has to do with the impact
of deliberation on policy- and decision-making.
132
The discussion below merely describes a selection of processes; it does not
advocate for any particular model. Each model or process has advantages and
disadvantages; each falls in a different space on Fung's democracy cube,
Arnstein's ladder, or IAP2's spectrum. Moreover, a number of the processes are
used at more than one stage of the policy process in varying ways. For example, a
number of the same processes can be used both for policymaking in legislation at
the local, state, or national level, and also for rulemaking or adopting administra-
tive agency regulations.
133
Step 1: Identifying a Policy Problem
Citizens can identify a policy problem through direct democracy, which in-
cludes the referendum and initiative process. Government can invite citizens to a
"community visioning process," in which the public in small groups engages in
structured brainstorming and dialogue with the help of a professional facilitator
regarding issues facing the community, e.g., how to use a reclaimed polluted
site.134 Where an existing policy controversy has polarized leaders in various
community constituencies and organizations, the Public Conversations Project
uses facilitated, face-to-face dialogue and communication to foster better mutual
understanding and reduce stereotyping, defensiveness, or polarization.' 35  Its
process focuses on community leaders and involves repeated, private, facilitated,
small group discussions over a period of months or longer. The goal is not
agreement, but enhanced communication. 136 This process was used for leaders inthe abortion/right-to-life controversy in Boston, Massachusetts. 137
130. Id.
131. Lyn Carson & Janette Hartz-Karp, Adapting and Combining Deliberative Designs, in THE
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 120, 122.
132. Id. at 123.
133. See supra tbl.1.
134. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE COMMUNITY VISIONING PROCESS 1-2 (SEPT. 2002), avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/pdfs/9comvis.pdf.
135. See Public Conversations Project, FAQ, http://www.publicconversations.org/project/?q=node/4
(last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
136. See Public Conversations Project, PCP's Approach, hup://www.publicconversations.org/
what/methodology (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
137. Public Conversations Project, Talking with the Enemy, http://www.publicconversations.org/
dialogue/policy/abortion (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
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Step 2: Identifying Approaches for Solving the Policy Problem
Government can use a citizens' jury for legislative purposes in a policy-
making context, as distinguished from civil or criminal juries that do fact finding
in a judicial or courtroom setting. In Denmark, the citizens' jury lets a representa-
tive group participate in the legislative process:
[T]hey are comprehensively informed about a technological issue, al-
lowed to question leading experts in the field and finally answer certain
preset questions. The jury is not required to achieve a consensus regard-
ing the answers it gives and in closing, the jury can vote on different
possible answers, which can be formulated by the jury itself.
. . . The purpose of a citizens' jury is to acquire an informed, well-
conceived and constructive expression of citizens' opinions.
38
The citizens' jury in Denmark has addressed complex matters of technology
policy, such as genetically manipulated plants. 139 Planning cells and consensus
conferences are closely related to the citizens' jury; in both processes, citizens
deliberate to reach consensus on a policy issue.
140
Study Circles produce materials for citizens to engage in dialogue on issues
such as civil rights, criminal justice, diversity, education, student success, growth
and sprawl, immigration, and other topics. 141 They help organize a representative
and diverse cross section of the city for community-wide dialogue. Study Circles
use facilitators. Groups meet across the community for a period of months. After
these small groups work in parallel, they come together to share ideas for solving
public problems in ways that will benefit the whole community. 142
What distinguishes these approaches is that citizens have the power to con-
duct a broad-ranging inquiry into the policy problem; they are not simply given
pre-defined options from which to choose.
138. See Teknologi-r~det, The Danish Bd. of Tech., Citizens' Jury, http://www.tekno.dk (follow
"Methods" hyperlink; then follow "Citizens' Jury" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
139. See Teknologi-rddet, The Danish Bd. of Tech., New GM Crops--New Debate,
http://www.tekno.dk (follow "Activities" hyperlink; then follow "Show All Activities" hyperlink; then
follow "New GM Crops - New Debate" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
140. Carolyn M. Hendriks, Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells: Lay Citizen Deliberations, in
THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 80, 87-90 (2005).
141. Patrick L. Scully & Martha L. McCoy, Study Circles: Local Deliberation as the Cornerstone of
Deliberative Democracy, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 199, 206-
209; see also Everyday-Democracy.org, http:/www.everyday-democracy.orglen/index.aspx (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009) (formerly the Study Circles Resource Center).
142. See Everyday-Democracy.org, The Basics of Dialogue to Change, http://www.everyday-
democracy.org/en/Page.Organizing.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
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Step 3: Setting Priorities among Solutions to a Policy Problem
One model increasingly in use is the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town
Meeting, 143 which is also used under the name Global Voices in international
settings, as the Citizens Summit in Denmark, 144 and in combination with other
processes such as the citizens' jury, televote, and consensus conference in Austral-
ia.145 These are high-technology, large-scale meetings.
AmericaSpeaks convened "Listening to the City," a 4,500-person group that
was a demographically representative sample of the electorate of New York City
for a full day of dialogue and deliberation about how to redevelop Ground Zero,
the site of the former World Trade Center. 146 At tables of ten to twelve people,
each with a professional mediator or facilitator, citizens had a chance to talk about
plans for Ground Zero. 147 They exchanged ideas, discussed priorities, and created
knowledge together, which was projected onto giant screens around the ballroom
so that everyone could see and share the ideas coming out from each small table's
discussion. Citizens then expressed preferences about priorities for these ideas,
using handheld, keypad voting devices that recorded their preferences together
with their demographic information. 149 By the end of the day, the AmericaSpeaks
"theme team," a combination of staff and citizens, was able to analyze all of this
data and to prepare a written report of what the people wanted. This report was
submitted to decision-makers and shared with citizens at the end of the day.'
50
This model is used for large-scale citizen meetings.' 5 1 A similar process was used
in Davos, Switzerland, at the World Economic Forum. 152
There is ongoing empirical research on the effectiveness of this process. Pre-
liminary findings suggest that care needs to be taken in clarifying its relation to
decision-making; interviews a year or two after the Town Meetings on regional
land use plans in Chicago, Illinois, and Cincinnati, Ohio, found that citizens did
143. See Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer, Joe Goldman & Steven Brigham., A Town Meeting for the 21st
Century, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 157, 157-60; Carolyn
Lukensmeyer & Steven Brigham, Taking Democracy to Scale: Large Scale Interventions-For
Citizens, 41 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 47, 48, 53-56 (2005); see also, AmericaSpeaks,
http://www.americaspeaks.org (last visited June 19, 2009).
144. See Teknologi-rtdet, The Danish Bd. of Tech., Citizens' Summit, http://www.tekno.dk (follow
"Methods" hyperlink; then follow "Citizens' Summit" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
145. Carson & Hartz-Karp, supra note 131, at 132-34. see also AmericaSpeaks, Case Studies-
Listening to the City, http://www.americaspeaks.org/ (follow "Projects" hyperlink; then follow "Case
Studies" hyperlink; then follow "listening to the City" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
146. Lukensmeyer et al., supra note 143, at 53; see also AmericaSpeaks, Case Studies-Listening to
the City, supra note 145.
147. Lukensmeyer et al., supra note 143. at 52; see also Civic ALLIANCE TO REBUILD DOWNTOWN
NEW YORK, LISTENING TO THE CITY: REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 5 (2002), available at
http://www.americaspeaks.org/document/docWindow.cfm?fuseaction=document.viewDocument&doc
umentid=65&documentFormatld= 131 [hereinafter LISTENING TO THE CITY].
148. Lukensmeyer et al., supra note 143, at 52-53.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 47-48.
152. See AmericaSpeaks, Projects-World Economic Forum, http://www.americaspeaks.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&PagelD=582&d:CFusionMX7\vertiy\date\dummytxt (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009); see also AmericaSpeaks--Global Voices, http://www.globalvoices.org/ (follow
"Our Clients" drop down menu; follow "Past Projects" drop down menu) (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
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not know whether there had been specific policy recommendations or whether any
policy recommendations had been adopted and implemented by government deci-
sion-makers. 153  There is evidence that individual participants experience in-
creased political and personal efficacy and enhanced trust in government.1
5 4
In National Issues Forums, people who attend large-scale citizen meetings are
organized into small groups for structured discussions of a limited number of poli-
cy choices. 155 It provides a briefing booklet for each issue with non-partisan in-
formation, which allows citizens to better understand the costs, benefits, impacts,
and consequences of various policy approaches. Through discussion with one
another, citizens may identify their own preferences in light of better information.
The briefing booklet provides a limited number of specific policy options for citi-
zens to compare and contrast.' 56 This model is most commonly used at the local
government or municipal level for local ordinances and policy choices or prob-
lems such as racial or ethnic conflict within a city.
In both of these processes, participants deliberate from the ground up on a de-
fined policy problem. They can have an open-ended discussion on their priorities.
Neither process is designed to develop unanimity or consensus. Instead, both
processes help citizens clarify their own policy preferences and better understand
the preferences of others. In theory, this permits some moderation of extreme
views.
Most recently, the European Union has undertaken a series of Citizens Fo-
rums for the purpose of dialogue and deliberation. Called the European Citizens'
Consultations, the project initially involved citizens from twenty-five member
states to deliberate on "what Europe do we want?" and select three topics for fu-
ture forums in the twenty-five member states. 157 The intention is to create the first
pan-European dialogue and strengthen European democracy.' 58 In addition, Eu-
rope is developing a network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from
civil society, including independent foundations, civic associations, and nonprofit
organizations to help support and implement large-scale policy dialogues. Spon-
sors include the Robert Bosch Foundation (Germany), the Charles lopold Mayer
Foundation (France), the Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy), the European Cultural
Foundation (Netherlands), and the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden). 59 In
their planned use of technology and large-scale dialogue, the planned summits
bear some similarity to the AmericaSpeaks process.
153. Lisa-Marie Napoli et a]., Assessing Deliberation: Agenda-Setting, Impacts, and Outcomes 28-30
(2006) (on file with author).
154. See Tina Nabatchi, Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Perceptions of
Political Efficacy (July 2007) (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University) (on file with author).
155. See National Issues Forums: About Us, http://www.nifi.org/about/index.aspx (last visited Dec.
15,2009).
156. See id.
157. See EUROPEAN CITIZENS' CONSULTATIONS, PROJECT SUMMARY 1-2 (2006), available at
http://www.zsi.at/attach/lAbout-the-project-ECC-A.pdf. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE
DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM 4 (2004) (Professor Aman
suggests that the European Union's democracy has certain deficits.).
158. See European Citizens' Consultations, Who Are We, http://www.european-citizens-
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Step 4: Selecting from among the Priorities
Processes for selecting among priorities may either be for the purpose of in-
forming decision-makers about citizens' preferences, as is the case with delibera-
tive polling, or may be agreement-seeking processes aimed at a single final policy
choice, such as policy dialogues or policy consensus processes. Daniel Yankelo-
vich, a leading advocate of dialogue and deliberation, served as an influential
pollster in the political arena for years. 16° He observed that polling results were
unstable in that citizens' answers changed in light of new information; he advo-
cates deliberation and dialogue to strengthen democracy by helping citizens
"come to public judgment." 161 He advocates a model called ChoiceDialogues,' 62
which engages citizens in three-stages: consciousness-raising, working through a
problem, and decision-making or resolution. 163 Key to this process is the distinc-
tion between dialogue and debate. Dialogue is about respectful exchanges of in-
formation and views in which people listen to find common ground and build
consensus; debate is about winning and losing, in which people listen to find
weaknesses and counterarguments.
Developed by Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, deliberative polling is
another process for obtaining better-informed citizen preferences. 164 Participants
have access to policy experts and an opportunity to deliberate with others. 165 De-
liberative polls have been conducted in the United States, Denmark, China, Aus-
tralia, and parts of Asia. 166 An initial survey assesses participant views before
deliberation. Participants then have an opportunity to examine non-partisan poli-
cy information and to ask a balanced panel of experts any questions they feel are
relevant. They deliberate amongst themselves over the substance of the policy
problem. At the end of the process, organizers again take an opinion survey to
assess participant preferences. A critical feature to deliberative polls is that they
involve a random sample of citizens; this means that the results of the process can
provide decision-makers with a statistically significant, representative account of
citizens' preferences after dialogue.
Empirical research over the past decade has documented that preferences
change after deliberation, illustrating that point-in-time opinion polls in the ab-
sence of complete information are unreliable as measures of citizen preferences.
160. See Daniel Yankelovich, Biography Information 2006, http://www.danyankelovich.com (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
161. DANIEL YANKELOVICH, COMING TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK IN A
COMPLEX WORLD (1991).
162. See Viewpoint Learning, Inc., Who We Are: Daniel Yankelovich,
http://www.viewpointlearning.com/about/yankelovich.shtmI (last visited Dec. 15, 2009); see also
Viewpoint Learning, Inc., ChoiceDialogueMethodology, http://www.viewpointleaming.comoffer/
methodology.shtml (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
163. Viewpoint Learning, Inc., Viewpoint Learning Model, http://www.viewpointlearning.coml
about/model.shtml (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
164. See generally Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY (2004).
165. James Fishkin & Cynthia Farrar, Deliberative Polling: From Experiment to Community Re-
source, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 68, 72-74 (2005). See gen-
erally Cir. for Deliberative Democracy, Research Papers, http://cdd.stanford.edu/research (last visited
June 19, 2009).
166. See Ctr. for Deliberative Democracy, Deliberative Polling, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/ (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
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Critics of deliberation suggest that opinions become more extreme;' 67 however,
the Schkade et al. empirical study 168 has been criticized as having a flawed re-
search design because the participants were not diverse, but rather started delibe-
ration with a similar viewpoint and because they were only permitted to deliberate
for fifteen minutes, 169 which is hardly sufficient time for a meaningful dialogue or
exchange. It stands to reason that a group of like-minded citizens who have their
views validated rather than challenged in a brief but large-scale meeting would
become more committed to those views.
Agencies also use agreement-seeking processes in this stage of the policy
continuum, such as a policy dialogue or the policy solutions model; these are de-
scribed under implementation. 1
70
Step 5: Drafting Proposed Legislation
The 21st Century Town Meeting model of AmericaSpeaks has been used with
success to foster a national discussion on a major issue for legislation in Ameri-
cans Discuss Social Security. 171 In this dialogue, nearly 50,000 Americans in fifty
states discussed Social Security reform and alternative legislative solutions to the
problem of funding a national pension welfare system.172 Organizers held two
ten-city teleconferences, a five-city regional teleconference, five town meetings,
and a seven-week online policy dialogue. 73 This project was a breakthrough
because before this experiment in civic engagement, legislators found the problem
of reforming this pension system to be politically intractable. Participants pro-
vided legislators with direct evidence that reform was politically feasible.
174
A model that received substantial scholarly attention is the Citizens' Assem-
bly in British Columbia, Canada. 175 This consisted of one male and one female
citizen randomly selected from each municipality or county in British Columbia
with a total membership of over 100 citizens. 76 Their assignment was to draft a
new structure for the electoral process in British Columbia. The Canadian nation-
al government agreed to submit their proposal to a referendum of the voters.
177
The Citizens Assembly met and deliberated regularly between 2004 and 2005 and
167. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74-
75 (2000); David Schkade et al., What Happened on Deliberation Day? 1 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ.,
OlinWorking Paper No. 298, AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr., Working Paper No. 06-19, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=911646 (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
168. See Schkade et al., supra note 167.
169. Interview with Terry Amsler, Program Director, Collaborative Governance Initiative, Inst. for
Local Gov't, Sacramento, Cal. (2008). See generally Inst. for Local Gov't, www.ca-ilg.org (last visited
June 19, 2009).
170. See discussion infra Part II.B.
171. See AmericaSpeaks, Case Studies-Americans Discuss Social Security,
http://www.americaspeaks.org/ (follow "Projects" hyperlink; then follow "Case Studies" hyperlink;




175. See Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, Improving Democracy in B.C.,
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
176. See B.C. CrrIZENs' ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM, MAKING EVERY VOTE COUNT 10
(2004), available at http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/final report.pdf.
177. See id. at 10-14.
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reached consensus on a proposal; while this proposal was approved by 58 percent
of the voters, it narrowly failed because an amendment to the provincial constitu-
tion required a supermajority. 178 NGOs in California are currently proposing a
citizens' assembly model to address issues of state governance., 79
Step 6: Enacting Legislation
The traditional forms for enacting legislation include direct democracy (the
referendum and initiative processes) and representative democracy (where elected
representatives make policy choices for citizens). There have been efforts to re-
duce the adversarial nature of the legislative process through training of legislators
in recent years. A leader in the United States for this work is the Policy Consen-
sus Initiative, which recently sponsored a two-day workshop entitled "Beyond
Bickering," at which more than sixty members of the Minnesota Legislature
learned about dispute resolution and "practical steps to finding consensus on con-
tentious issues" in a legislative setting.
180
Step 7: Identifying Policy Problems for the Executive Power to Resolve
within the Boundaries of the Legislation
As with legislative action, conflict also arises in the quasi-legislative process
of developing rules and regulations to flesh out the details of legislation and carry
its public policy choices into effect. The same processes are useful. At the local
government level, community visioning is used for land use planning. The 21st
Century Town Meeting has been used for regional land use and economic devel-
opment planning-for example, in the region surrounding Chicago, Illinois 181 -
and currently for the Voices and Choices project in northeast Ohio, a project
funded through collaboration of over eighty philanthropies to foster an unprece-
dented civic engagement initiative that will reach 39,000 people.'
82
Step 8: Identifying Approaches or Tools for Regulations
Again, deliberative polling, study circles, citizens' juries, and various forms
of policy dialogues can help administrators gain a better understanding of citizen
178. See ELECTIONS BC, STATEMENT OF VOTES: REFERENDUM ON ELECTORAL REFORM 9 (2005),
available at http://www.elections.bc.ca/docs/rpt/SOV-2005-ReferendumOnElectoralReform.pdf.
179. See, e.g, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, CITzENs' ASSEMBLY: AN EFFECTIVE VEHICLE FOR
POLITICAL REFORM, available at http://www.newamerica.net/filesCitizens%2OAssembly.pdf (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
180. Policy Consensus Initiative & Nat'l Policy Consensus Ctr., "Beyond Bickering," Minnesota
Legislators Attend Two-Day Consensus Building Workshop, http://www.policyconsensus.org/events/
beyondbickeringMN.html, (last visited June 19, 2009). This effort was also sponsored by the National
Council of State Legislators. Id.
181. See AmericaSpeaks, Project-Common Ground Chicago Regional Forum,
http://www.americaspeaks.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&PagetD=567&d:\CFusionMX7\
verity\Data\dummy.txt (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
182. See Advance Northeast Ohio, Our Action Plan, http://www.advancenortheastohio.org/actionplan
(last visited Dec. 15, 2009); see also Advance Northeast Ohio, Voices and Choices,
http://www.advancenortheastohio.org/search/nodetVoices+and+Choices (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
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preferences for various policy tools or approaches. The Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention are engaged in a national process combining collaborative
public management in a network of stakeholders with civic engagement to address
the regulatory problem of a possible flu pandemic and how to manage supplies of
a theoretical vaccine. 183 The project has used multiple methods to get citizens
involved.
184
B. Midstream in the Policy Process-Deliberative or Participatory
Governance, Collaborative Public or Network Management, and ADR
In this part of the continuum, there is wide variation in processes. All three
categories of deliberative or participatory governance processes, collaborative
public or network management, and ADR are used to resolve conflict.' 85 There is
no strict boundary between upstream and midstream. Somewhere between the
legislative act of adopting policy and the quasi-legislative work of implementing
it, there is a shift in the nature of processes related to governance from more deli-
berative processes that set priorities to agreement-seeking processes. In agree-
ment-seeking processes, generally a mediator or facilitator works with a group of
citizens or network of stakeholders to build consensus around the elements of a
specific plan, permit, or policy proposal. 186 Typically, that neutral will engage in
a conflict-assessment process before convening the stakeholder group in order to
assess the feasibility of reaching consensus.' 87 Mediation is particularly prevalent
in environmental governance.
188
The neutral generally uses principles of interest-based bargaining or prin-
cipled negotiation. 189 This approach involves a focus on the interests of the par-
ties rather than their adversarial positions. The mediator or facilitator may identi-
fy interests by asking problem-solving questions (who, what, where, why, how,
why not) to get at the stakeholders' basic human and organizational needs. 90
These will, most often, fall into one of five categories: (1) needs relating to securi-
ty; (2) economic well-being; (3) belonging to a community, organization, or social
group; (4) recognition; and (5) autonomy. 19 1 Parties engage in brainstorming, aprocess through which they first generate a list of possible solutions. 192 They next
183. For details, participant guides, and a complete report, see The Keystone Center, Health Policy-
Pandemic Flu, http://www.keystone.org/spp/health-and-social-policy/infectious-disease (last visited
Dec. 15, 2009).
184. See Julie Fanselow, CDC Honored for Public Engagement on Pandemic Flu, EVERYDAY
DEMOCRACY, Dec. 3, 2007, hup://www.everyday-democracy.org/en/Article.647.aspx (last visited Dec.
15, 2009).
185. For numerous case studies, see THE CONSENSUS-BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 106
186. MOORE, supra note 79, at 8, 15-17.
187. td. at 61-65.
188. Rosemary O'Leary and Susan Summers Raines, Dispute Resolution at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
supra note 61, at 253-76 (2003).
189. FISHER ET AL., supra note 78, at 10-11; see also Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Gover-
nance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503, 503 (2008) (arguing that interest-
based negotiation skills are essential for the new governance).
190. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 78, at 47.
191. Id. at 48-49.
192. See id. at 60-62.
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prioritize among these ideas, deliberate on them, and attempt to reach consensus.
In the event of impasse, the stakeholders are encouraged to use objective criteria,
moral and professional standards, and other sources in a reasoned exchange rather
than threaten to use leverage or bargaining power.
193
In mediation, the neutral can assist the parties with this negotiation process by
meeting with sub-groups or individual stakeholders in caucus, a private confiden-
tial session.1 94 The mediator can also help the parties by using active listening
techniques such as paraphrasing and restating, by framing and reframing issues
and suggestions, helping them identify their best alternative to a negotiated
agreement (BATNA), and reality-testing about what might happen if parties fail to
reach an agreement. 195 Facilitators may use many of these techniques, but do not
define their task as assisting the parties in reaching an agreement. Instead, they
foster an organized discussion; nevertheless, this discussion may produce a con-
sensus.
196
When viewed on the policy continuum, collaborative public management is
most frequently found midstream, during implementation and project manage-
ment. Examples include such work as negotiated rulemaking to collaboratively
develop rules to implement public law, or collaboration in managing a project,
e.g., watershed management. In the latter case, a watershed will cross jurisdic-
tional boundaries and implicate the legal authority of federal, state, regional, local,
and tribal governments; concerned stakeholders will include various representa-
tives from civil society such as nonprofit environmental organizations, citizen
groups representing users of natural resources, and the private sector. Sometimes,
a downstream enforcement process, such as a complex piece of multiparty envi-
ronmental litigation, will be transformed through the mechanism of a negotiated
consent decree into an ongoing collaborative public management network for
supervising an environmental cleanup, for example. The military has also used
collaborative public management in its procurement contract relationships.' 97
Step 9: Setting Priorities for Regulations
Deliberative polls, policy and ChoiceDialogues, and other deliberative forums
can be used in this stage of the policy process in much the same way as earlier
described. For example, in Canada, twelve ChoiceWork Dialogues were held
across the country to discuss reform of the Canadian national health care system:
Participants were asked to accomplish two major tasks during the day: first,
to create their own vision of the health care system they would like to see in ten
years' time; and second, to work through the practical choices and tradeoffs re-
193. See id. at 85.
194. MOORE, supra note 79, at 368-69.
195. See id. at 228, 235-44, 306, 330.
196. See generally, Leach & Sabatier, supra note 103.
197. Dymond reports that collaborations "among competing DOD contractors, whether called 'team-
ing arrangements,' 'joint ventures,' 'strategic alliances,' 'subcontracts,' 'associations,' [']licensing
arrangements,' 'partnering,' or 'leader-follower agreements,' provide a variety of benefits to market
participants in winning and keeping DOD contracts." Major Francis Dymond, DOD Contractor Colla-
borations: Proposed Procedures for Integrating Antitrust Law, Procurement Law, and Purchasing
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quired to realize that vision. They first worked in self-facilitated groups to ensure
that the conclusions reached would be their own. They then worked in a plenary
session in which the facilitators prompted them to identify the key similarities and
differences among the groups' reports and to further define the areas of common
ground.1
98
The kinds of regulatory priorities identified involved "having a team of medi-
cal professionals (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and others) . . . provide primary
care... supported by a central information system," which would require partici-
pants to sign up with a provider team for one year instead of using solo practition-
ers, use a nurse for routine care, and have electronic medical records.'
99
Step 10: Selecting from among Priorities for Regulations
The budgeting process is a classic example of a situation in which citizens
have been asked to select from among various priorities and allocate resources.
The most lauded participatory budgeting process internationally is an institutiona-
lized part of local governance in Porto Alegre, Brazil. z° In this process, citizens
in various neighborhoods select among priorities for infrastructure and other in-
vestment by municipal budget authorities.201 Participatory budgeting in China is a
new and experimental process, and it involves dialogue and deliberation among a
representative sample of citizens; one case included farmers, the commercial sec-
202tor, and local government officials. Surveys, deliberation, and polls were re-
cently used in Menlo Park, California, to determine how to cut the city's budg-
et.2 °3 The District of Columbia has used the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century TownMeeting for participatory budgeting four times. 204
Step 11: Drafting Proposed Regulations
The United States has experimented with and institutionalized a process re-
ferred to as negotiated rulemaking, regulatory negotiation, or rule by consensus
under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996 (NRA).2°5 The NRA was adopted
to allow collaboration among a representative group of organizations and stake-
holders to craft draft regulations; it is a top-down, carefully structured statute that
contains this form of collaborative public management within express limits.
198. Judith Maxwell et al., Giving Citizens a Voice in Healthcare Policy in Canada, 326 BRrr. MED.
J. 1031, 1031 (2003).
199. Id. at 1032.
200. See Fung, supra note 123, at 71-72 (2006).
201. See id. at 71.
202. James Fishkin, et al., Public Consultation Through Deliberation in China: The First Chinese
Deliberative Poll 4-6, tbl.1 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2005/deliberation-china.pdf.
203. See Community Focus, Clients, http://www.communityfocus.org/clients.html (last visited Dec.
15, 2009).
204. See AmericaSpeaks, Case Studies-Neighborhood Action DC Citizen Summit,
http://www.americaspeaks.org/ (follow "Projects" hyperlink; then follow "Case Studies" hyperlink;
then follow "D.C. Citizens' Summit" hyperlink) (last visited Dec, 15, 2009); District of Columbia,
Neighborhood Action-Citizen Summit, http://cs.ona.dc.gov/cs/site/default.asp?csNav=132990l (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
205. For a description of the NRA, see infra part IV.A.5.
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There are a number of examples in the literature at the federal 206 and state le-
vels. 207 It has been used to reach a compromise between dog-walkers and birders
in the Golden Gate Recreation Area20 8 and has been applied to fisheries manage-
ment,209 combined sewer overflows, 21 and air quality, among many other top-
ics.
2 12
Step 12: Enacting Regulations
Enacting regulations is traditionally accompanied by forms of public partici-
pation such as notice and comment and a traditional public hearing. Notice con-
sists of publication of a notice of intent to adopt rules or regulations in a regular
government publication or online. Comment consists simply of an opportunity for
the public to submit written suggestions as to the substance of the proposed rules.
A traditional public hearing consists of a brief opportunity for citizens to address
the decision-making body or its representative. It is largely a passive activity
during which citizens listen to a series of speakers but do not interact or deliberate
on the policy problem.
More recently, new online technologies have made possible "e-rulemaking,"
including threaded discussion forums 213 and electronic rulemaking dockets
through which citizens may submit comments. 2 14 At present, there is modest ex-
perimentation. 2 15 Some observe that the process holds great potential to expand
the participation of the general public in the rulemaking process, 2 16 but others find
that the costs in terms of analyzing comments with sufficient care to withstand
206. See generally Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Nego-
tiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000); Cary Coglianese, Assessing
the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386
(2001).
207. See, e.g., Daniel P. Selmi, The Promise and Limits of Negotiated Rulemaking: Evaluating the
Negotiation of a Regional Air Quality Rule, 35 ENVTL. L. 415 (2005).
208. Robin McCall, Dogs vs. Birds: Negotiated Rulemaking at Fort Funston, 13 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 187, 188, 203-04 (2007).
209. Shepherd R. Grimes, The Federal Regional Fishery Management Councils: A Negotiated Rule-
making Approach to Fisheries Management, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 187-88 (2001).
210. Siobhan Mee, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs): Consensus
Saves Ossification?, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213-14 (1997).
211. Charles E. McChesney 11, The Interstate Ozone Pollution Negotiations: OTAG, EPA, and a
Novel Approach to Negotiated Rulemaking, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 615, 661 (1999).
212. For a discussion on the limits of stakeholder collaboration in rulemaking, see Mark Seidenfeld,
Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 411, 413 (2000) (arguing that interest group dynamics impede a truly collaborative
regulatory process).
213. Gregory S. Weber, Needling the Thread: A Moderator's Guide to Freedom of Speech Limita-
tions on Government Sponsored Web-Based Threaded Discussions, 8 COMP. L. REV. & TECH J. 323,
323 (2004).
214. Michfle Ferenz & Colin Rule with Commentator William Moomaw, RuleNet: an Experiment in
Online Consensus-Building, in THE CONSENSUS-BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 106, at 879-901.
215. See Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE
L.J. 943, 943-45, 968 (2006) (finding based on analysis of the available evidence that e-rulemaking's
potential for a revolutionary change in public participation is limited).
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judicial review may outweigh the benefits. 217 One empirical study found that it
has provided simply one more avenue for voice without imposing a substantial
burden on the agency.
218
Step 13: Implementing Regulations
Conflict also arises when administrators seek to implement public policy
through regulatory activity. Moreover, many policy problems cross jurisdictional
and boundaries of public, private, and nonprofit sectors; solutions require the col-
laboration of multiple stakeholders, such as national, regional, and local govern-
ment actors, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. There are agreement-
seeking models that are used at this stage of the policy process in order to get the
work of government accomplished. Administrators have used consensus-building
and ADR processes, including facilitated policy consensus and mediation, to help
stakeholders and affected public constituencies reach agreement. In mediation, an
impartial third party and limited number of disputants often seek a resolution as
their goal.2 19 The term facilitation refers to a process in which an impartial third
party helps organize and direct a discussion among a larger group of stakehold-
ers.
220
It is common to build a conciliation step into the dispute resolution mechan-
isms of international treaties and accords. These processes are also increasingly
common for land use and permitting disputes in environmental governance.221 In
the United States, Congress created a new federal agency, the U.S. Institute for
Environmental Conflict Resolution, to help with such efforts.
222
One model is the policy consensus process. For example, Public Solutions is
sponsored by the National Policy Consensus Center. 223 In Public Solutions, an
elected official, public administrator, or leader from state or local government
helps convene a stakeholder group in a neutral forum. 22 4 With the help of an im-
partial facilitator, the group works to reach consensus on a solution to a policy
problem. In this form of collaborative governance, sponsors identify an issue;
there is a conflict assessment to determine if collaboration is feasible and who the
stakeholders are; a leader convenes the group; the group frames the issue and
agrees upon the framework and conditions for deliberation; and the participants
execute a written agreement to ensure accountability. 22' The Public Solutions
model's key principles include transparency, equity, inclusiveness, effective-
217. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political
Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 893,939-40 (2006).
218. John M. de Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal Communications
Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969, 969 (2006).
219. See CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 104, at 187, 191-92; MOORE, supra note 79, at 8;
SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 106, at 162.
220. See SCHWARZ, THE SKILLED FACILITATOR, supra note 103, at 5.
22 1. See THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note
61, at 8-9.
222. See U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resol., http://www.ecr.gov/ (last visited June 19, 2009).
223. See Policy Consensus Initiative & Nat'l Policy Consensus Ctr., Public Solutions,
http://www.policyconsensus.org/publicsolutions/index.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
224. See Policy Consensus Initiative & Nat'l Policy Consensus Ctr., Public Solutions Operating
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ness/efficiency, responsiveness, accountability, forum neutrality, and consensus-
based decision-making.
2 6
The implementation phase also encompasses collaborative public or network
management.2 2 7 For example, at the municipal level, Los Angeles has neighbor-
hood councils that work with city agencies to prioritize service delivery for partic-
ular areas of the city.22 8 These councils consist of elected representatives of local
neighborhoods who negotiate memoranda of understanding with city depart-
ments.
229
C. Downstream in the Policy Process-Using ADR to Resolve Conflict
among Identified Disputants
ADR can be used for both executive agency action and disputes within the ju-
risdiction of the judiciary. Generally, these processes are quasi-judicial or judicial
in that they assist specific, identified disputants and are retrospective in nature;
they examine the facts of past events that gave rise to a dispute. The processes
may either seek a voluntary settlement agreement (mediation) or may provide
disputants with a decision that ends their conflict more expeditiously than tradi-
tional agency or court adjudication (fact-finding, advisory arbitration, or binding
arbitration).
Step 14: Enforcing Legislation and Regulations--Executive Administrative
Agencies
The executive power uses ADR in enforcement activities, including, again,
mediation, fact-finding, advisory arbitration, and binding arbitration. These
processes first found their way into U.S. executive agencies as means for resolv-
ing conflict in collective bargaining and labor relations; a famous U.S. example
was the War Labor Board created during World War II to address labor issues in a
way that would not interfere with the production of war material. Over the past
decade, ADR has become well-, if unevenly, institutionalized as a set of tools for
resolving conflict in governance processes enforcing legislation and regulations in
the U.S. government. 23° In addition, state governments in the United States also
use ADR.23'
226. Policy Consensus Initiative & Nat'l Policy Consensus Ctr., Public Solutions System Principles,
http://www.policyconsensus.org/publicsolutions/ps_4.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
227. "Here are some examples: . . . cooperative arrangements involving governmental and nongo-
vernmental entities in delivering family services or administering Medicare; and negotiation, in the
draconian shadow of the Endangered Species Act, of regional habitat conservation plans by federal
natural resource management agencies, private landowners, developers, and state and local govern-
ments." Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,
448-49 (2003); see also discussion supra Part ll.B.
228. Cooper et al., Citizen-Centered, supra note 67, at 79, 82.
229. See Pradeep Chandra Kathi & Terry L. Cooper, Democratizing the Administrative State: Con-
necting Neighborhood Councils and City Agencies, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 559,563-64 (2005).
230. See SENGER, supra note 89, at 18-32, 74-77; Tina Nabatchi, The Institutionalization of Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution in the Federal Government, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 646, 647 (2007). The Web
site of the federal Interagency ADR Working Group contains numerous resources, model practices,
and guidelines developed for mediation and other ADR processes in civil enforcement, public policy,
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Step 15: Enforcing Legislation and Regulations through Judicial Power
Over the past century, courts have increasingly turned fact-finding and adju-
dication over to alternative forums such as administrative adjudication and arbitra-
232tion. ADR programs are increasingly common methods for resolving conflict
involving specific identified parties arising out of past events. Forms of ADR
include mediation, fact-finding, advisory arbitration, binding arbitration, mini-
trials, and summary jury trials. Mediation is in increasingly widespread use in
national judicial systems. A recent study reviewed programs in Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England, Wales, Scotland, Germany, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Poland, South Africa, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. 23  In the United
States, every federal district court must establish an ADR program pursuant to the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998.211 In addition, there are mediation
programs in the U.S. federal courts of appeals235 and throughout the fifty states.236
In the United States, a network of community mediation centers provides media-
tion services for small claims and neighborhood disputes either by contract with
the courts or independently as NGOs.237
In the European Union, there are both national and regional projects to build
ADR practice both inside and independent from courts-but in the shadow of the
justice system-for civil and commercial disputes. 238 The European Union has
adopted a code of conduct for mediators. 239 It is also building a private dispute
resolution infrastructure through the "MEDA Programme" to address business and
commercial conflict.
240
and environmental disputes. See Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group,
http://www.adr.gov/index.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009). Federal agencies also use ADR for internal
disputes in employment or with contractors in procurement matters. Id.
231. For links to state programs, see http://www.policyconsensus.org, the Web site of the Policy
Consensus Initiative, an NGO that supports the use of ADR and collaborative governance at the level
of state government (last visited Dec. 15, 2009). See also Policy Consensus Initiative & Nat'l Policy
Consensus Ctr., Directory of State Programs, http://www.policyconsensus.org/directory/index.html
(last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
232. See Judith Resnik, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century: Whither and Whether
Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (2006).
233. GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION, supra note 87.
234. See SENGER, supra note 89, at 14.
235. See Fed. Jud. Ctr., Inside the Federal Courts, How Cases Move Through Federal Courts: Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe !openform&nav
=menu I &page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/290 (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
236. See Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Knowledge and Information Services, Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution, http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/Publications/ADR/default.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
237. Beth Gazley et al., Collaboration and Citizen Participation in Community Mediation Centers, 23
REV. POL'Y RES. 843, 843 (2006); see also Nat'l Ass'n for Cmty. Mediation, http://www.nafcm.org
(last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
238. See Eur. Comm'n, European Jud. Network: Alternative Dispute Resolution--General Informa-
tion, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr-gen-en.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009) (providing a
country-by-country status report).
239. See Eur. Comm'n, European Jud. Network: Alternative Dispute Resolution-Community Law,
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr ec codeconduct-en.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
240. See ADR MEDA, Outline, http://www.adrmeda.org/outline.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).The
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Moreover, ADR is perhaps the only form of governance for international dis-
putes, since there is no single authoritative sovereign judiciary. All international
tribunals are established through an agreement of nations to submit to their juris-
diction; hence, they are all forms of mediation and arbitration. Examples include
the Court of Arbitration for Sport established to resolve disputes related to interna-
tional athletic competitions such as the Olympic Games, 24 arbitration boards
established through trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the World Trade Organization,2 4 2 and the International Court of
243Justice, to name but a few.
In addition to these mechanisms, a network of private ADR service providers
is serving the needs for commercial dispute resolution among the international
business community through mediation and binding arbitration.2 44 There are a
number of NGOs that provide access to arbitration services and model rules, in-
cluding the International Chamber of Commerce,2 45 and arbitration centers in
London, Stockholm, Hong Kong, and a number of other commercial centers
worldwide.
V. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC LAW: THE LIMITS OF
CURRENT LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Collaboration in governance is not new; U.S. history provides a dynamic and
iterative pattern of innovation and legislation. For almost a century, there have
been repeated attempts to balance agencies' need to consult and gather informa-
tion from stakeholders outside government with transparency and accountability.
Professor Richard Stewart describes the evolution of administrative law in five
stages.246 First, the United States took from England the common law model in
which citizens brought tort actions against regulatory officials to seek judicial
review of their actions. 247 Second, with industrialization in the late nineteenth
century and the first commissions and regulatory agencies, the common law mod-
el yielded to the "traditional model of administrative law," in which courts re-
quired agencies to use adjudication modeled on courtroom process before rate-
making or other action; the courts then engaged in judicial review of the agency's
fact-finding based on the record and its statutory authority. 248 Third, during the
New Deal, Congress created agencies with open-ended statutory delegations of
discretionary power, raising constitutional concerns about their accountability.2
49
241. See Court of Arbitration for Sport, History of the CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/history (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
242. See World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis-e/tif e/displ e.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
243. See Int'l Court of Justice, The Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/
index.php?pl l &PHPSESSID=e5ee6I4bcda79alee468790595cd350b (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
244. See, e.g., Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Arbitration, Mediation, and Other Forms of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution (ADR), http://www.adr.org/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2009); Int'l Inst. for Conflict Pre-
vention & Resolution, CPR: Home, http://www.cpradr.org/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
245. See Int'l Chamber of Commerce, ICC Dispute Resolution Services, http://www.iccwbo.org/
court/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
246. Stewart, supra note 227, at 439.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 439-40.
249. Id. at 440.
[Vol. 2009
38
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2009, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss2/2
Collaborative Governance
In response to the perceived democracy deficit, James Landis advocated regulato-
ry management by experts "[g]uided by experience and professional discip-
line. 250  This vision helped shape the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
enacted in 1946.251
Stewart reports three developments that changed administrative law in the
1 960s: (1) acceptance of Ralph Nader's critique that agencies were dominated by
the industry they regulate; (2) the rise of public interest litigation through envi-
ronmental, consumer, civil rights, and labor advocates; and (3) the adoption of
new laws on the environment, health, safety, civil rights, welfare, and Medicare,
sometimes termed the "rights revolution." 252 He argues that this gave rise to the
fourth stage of administrative law, which he terms the "interest representation
model, 253 during which agencies shifted from adjudication to quasi-legislative
rulemaking. This included expanded judicial review, participation by public in-
terest advocacy groups, and an examination of the rulemaking record under the
"hard look" doctrine to determine if the agency had considered participants' sub-
missions and justified its exercise of discretion based on the record. A key
feature of this stage is the need for the agency to respond to the concerns of all
affected interests. 5 5 Adversarial legalism continued in the form of citizen-suits to
force agency action. The fifth stage as "analytic management of regulation," was
imposed, through executive order, to control agency discretion and perceived
excesses using cost-benefit analysis and executive oversight.
256
Stewart argues that the current structure of administrative law is still evolving
and has turned to two new regulatory methods: (1) "government-stakeholder
network structures and (2) economic incentive systems. ' 257 Stewart uses new
governance examples from collaborative public management, negotiated rulemak-
ing, and consensus policy-making. He argues that these new methods of regula-
tion must confront issues of accountability and political legitimacy raised by net-
works' blurring of the public-private distinction.
258
We have reached a state of complexity in governance where collaboration is
essential. I argue here that public voice, not only in the form of interest groups
and stakeholders, but also through direct civic engagement of citizens and resi-
dents, can address emerging concerns about accountability and legitimacy in the
new governance through enhanced transparency.
In fact, transparency has been the remedy of choice for accountability con-
cerns arising out of collaboration. Each of the evolutionary stages of administra-
tive law has brought with it new legal infrastructure to open governance to public
view following a period during which government officials attempted to work
privately with stakeholders to address public policy problems. Within the execu-
250. Id. at441.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 441-42. This development has been chronicled in detail in ROBERT A. KAGAN,
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2003) (describing the impact of a litigation-
based lawyering model on policy).
253. Stewart, supra note 227, at 442.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 443-44.
257. Id. at 448.
258. Id. at 451.
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tive branch, agencies must comply with the APA,25 9 Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), 26 Government in the Sunshine Act,2 61 Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA),262 NRA,263 and Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA). 64
The APA opened up adjudication and rulemaking to public participation fol-
lowing the New Deal and Schecter Poultry.265 FOIA and the Sunshine Act made
possible public scrutiny of records and opened agency meetings during the "rights
revolution" of the 1960s.2 66 FACA drew back the curtain on groups of stakehold-
ers that agencies convened to provide information for the governance process
during the decades following World War 11.267 The NRA and ADRA can be
viewed as legal infrastructure intended to enhance public participation through
new collaborative processes following good government reforms of the 1970s and
experimentation with consensus-building in the 1980s.268 The NRA subjects ne-
gotiated rulemaking committees to FACA;269 the ADRA sets guidelines for the
balance between confidentiality and public access in federal agency use of
ADR.270
However, our existing legal framework for administrative law was not framed
to encompass the full extent of collaborative governance as it has now evolved in
practice. Professor Jody Freeman has articulated a theory of collaborative gover-
nance with five components: (1) a problem-solving orientation; (2) participation
by interested and affected parties in all stages of the decision-making process; (3)
provisional solutions subject to continuous monitoring, evaluation, and revision;
(4) accountability that transcends traditional public and private roles in gover-
nance; and (5) a flexible, engaged agency.2
7 1
Our existing legal framework poses obstacles and barriers to collaborative
governance and the kind of civic engagement and public participation that would
provide the transparency necessary to address concerns about collaboration. This
section will survey salient examples of administrative laws affecting collaborative
governance in U.S. federal and state government. This is only a preliminary sur-
vey; a more comprehensive analysis, including an empirical study of obstacles and
barriers that practitioners experience in the field, is the subject of future work.
259. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006).
260. Id. § 552.
261. Id. § 552b.
262. Id. app. 2 §§ 1-6.
263. Id. §§ 561-570.
264. Id. §§ 571-584.
265. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, 42-46 (William F. Funk et al. eds.,
American Bar Association 4th ed. 2008).
266. Id. at 676-690, 725-732.
267. Id. at 549-553.
268. Id. at 397-410, 941-947.
269. 5 U.S.C. § 565 (2006).
270. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 265, at 403-405.
271. Freeman, supra note 16, at 22. While she examines collaborative governance primarily in the
context of federal agencies using negotiated rulemaking and consensus processes to develop permits,
and my discussion is primarily framed in terms of the federal government, her criteria and my analysis
apply equally to collaborative governance at the local, regional, state, federal, and transnational levels.
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A. Legal Infrastructure in the Federal Executive Branch
In the United States, federal administrative agencies are sometimes thought of
as a fourth branch of government in which the judicial, legislative, and executive
functions from the other three are collapsed.272 They have substantial discretion to
273choose among different governance processes under the APA, which provides
for both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agency action. The term quasi-
legislative refers to agency action that is synoptic, prospective, and general in
application, and that sets standards, guidelines, expectations, or rules and regula-
tions for behavior. Traditional rulemaking can meet these criteria, particularly for
substantive or legislative rules. 274 The term quasi-judicial usually refers to agency
action that is retrospective, fact-based, and determines the rights or obligations of
selected citizens or stakeholders rather than those of the general public. It encom-
passes formal and informal adjudication.
These statutes were not drafted expressly to authorize agencies to collaborate
in networks with other actors, nor with a view toward joint agency action. Their
unit of analysis, the obligations they impose and processes they authorize, all take
as their starting place individual agency action and circumscribed public participa-
tion. The resulting disconnection between the goals and language of these statutes
and emerging collaborative governance practices creates problems we need to
address.
1. The Administrative Procedure Act: A Statute for Agencies Acting Alone
275
The APA, enacted in response to the growth of the administrative state dur-
ing the New Deal, was a substantial breakthrough in the public's right to know
about-and participate in-processes of governance in federal administrative
agencies.276 It encompasses formal and informal agency action. 7 Formal agency
action can take the forms of rulemaking or adjudication. In rulemaking, agencies
create general rules of prospective application. Rulemaking generally involves
272. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 19 at 11-12.
273. Id. at 6-7.
274. Id. at 59.
275. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006).
276. For a discussion of the history and purposes of the APA, see Gerald M. Pops, Administrative
Law as Public Policy, 2 J. POL'Y HisT. 98 (1990) (describing the original tension between the orga-
nized bar's efforts to protect the property rights of private citizens and corporations and agencies'
desire for efficient and expert action to solve the problems of society, and citing Richard Stewart's
interest representation model explaining how the expansion of standing, public access and participation
by underrepresented groups, and judicial review was seen as a way to protect people from govern-
ment).
277. Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL
L. REv. 95, 97 (2003) (observing that the APA addresses rulemaking and adjudication, but fails to
recognize priority setting, resource allocation, research, planning, targeting, guidance, and strategic
enforcement, among other modes of agency action). Professor Rubin argues for a revision of the APA
that would conceive of "administrative governance as an instrumentally rational process carried out by
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published notice and an opportunity for members of the public to comment, al-
though generally not through an oral evidentiary hearing.
278
In adjudication, an agency determines individual rights through a retrospec-
tive examination of evidence and facts. Adjudication procedures range from in-
formal ones (the kind a school principal engages in when she disciplines a stu-
dent) to formal adjudication subject to Goldberg v. Kelly's279 full requirements.280
Formal adjudication under the APA involves an adjudicatory hearing before an
administrative law judge with many of the requisites of procedural due process.
Informal agency action, rulemaking, and adjudication together provide for
agency action across the entire policy cycle, from policymaking and implementa-
tion to enforcement. The APA fundamentally altered the relation of citizens and
stakeholders to the government. It made the work of government more transpa-
rent through public notice in rulemaking. It also created an explicit and legitimate
voice for citizens through opportunities to comment on proposed rules. Formal
and informal adjudication procedures gave citizens and stakeholders a voice and
an opportunity to be heard before government substantially interfered with their
interests in life, liberty, or property.
However, the APA contemplates action by a single agency, acting alone and
not in collaboration with other agencies, whether federal, state, or local. Neither
the word collaboration (in any form), nor the word network, appears in its text.
Moreover, it does not have formal provisions for collaborative management in
networks with other organizations, whether private, nonprofit, or other stakehold-
ers.281 This silence creates ambiguities for collaborative public management net-
works.
278. See PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 31-33 (Phillip J. Cooper & Chester A. Newland
eds., Peacock Publishers 3d ed. 2000); CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 83-84 (2d ed. 1999); ROSENBLOOM, supra note 19, at 65-
68; DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM & ROSEMARY O'LEARY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAW 60, 139-43
(2d ed. 1997).
279. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
280. This includes notice, the right to present evidence, confrontation and cross-examination of wit-
nesses, oral argument, legal counsel, and a written decision stating reasons enunciated in this landmark
Supreme Court decision. See id. at 267-71.
281. The definition of "agency" provides:
For the purpose of this subchapter-
(1) "agency" means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include -
(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia;
or except as to the requirements of section 552 of this title
(E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organiza-
tions of the parties to the disputes determined by them;
(F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory; or
(H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739, 1743, and 1744 of title 12; chapter 2 of title
41; subchapter 11 of chapter 471 of title 49; or sections 1884, 1891-1902, and former section
1641 (b)(2), of title 50, appendix....
5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006).
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The APA provides for notice and comment in rulemaking, but it does not de-
fine the form that public participation in rulemaking should take;2 82 instead, the
courts have carved out an area of agency discretion with the rejection of hybrid
rulemaking or imposition of adversary legalism on the rulemaking process. 28
3
On the other hand, this very silence creates problems when agencies would
like to innovate. For example, large-scale public dialogues, with many people
talking together in small groups, raise questions for judicial review. How do we
reconcile this many simultaneous oral comments with requirements for creating a
rulemaking record? How does the agency prove that it responded to significant
comments in the record?
284
Moreover, the vast majority of agency action is informal. This includes most
work implementing and managing public policy. The APA is largely silent on this
aspect of agency authority, except as regards allowing the public to petition the
agency for a response that can in turn be submitted for judicial review. 285 Thus,
282. The provisions for notice and comment do not mandate an oral hearing:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that there is in-
volved-
(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans,
grants, benefits, or contracts.
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless per-
sons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice the-
reof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and is-
sues involved. Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply--
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor [sic] in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity
to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented,
the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 days
before its effective date, except--
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment,
or repeal of a rule.
5 U.S.C. § 553.
283. The Supreme Court famously rejected mandates for cross examination in Vermont Yankee Nuc-
lear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
284. See Benjamin, supra note 217, at 916 (raising this issue in the context of e-rulemaking).
285. See 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2006). 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) provides:
Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written application, petition, or
other request of an interested person made in connection with any agency proceeding. Except in
affirming a prior denial or when the denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied
by a brief statement of the grounds for denial.
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there is no express legal authority for engaging the public in this sphere of agency
action. If an agency chooses to engage the public, it may be accused of waste and
mismanagement by expending funds on activities that are neither required nor
expressly authorized.
2. The Freedom of Information and Sunshine Acts
The reform movement for more transparency in government gave rise to legal
infrastructure creating a right to access government records and also a right to
notice regarding the public meetings at which agencies make decisions and take
action. These provisions often create issues for agencies using processes for ne-
gotiation and collaboration. At what point must the collaborative network dis-
close documents? What is the public's right to attend meetings of a collaborative
network? Some commentators have suggested that these laws inhibit the use of
consensus-building processes among groups of stakeholders in public policy is-
sues. 28 6 Federal dispute resolution laws have provided for confidentiality in cer-
tain circumstances.2 87 However, the sunshine laws contemplate traditional action
by a single agency, not joint action among several. This can create inefficiencies
and barriers.
3. The Federal Advisory Committees Act
In an effort to make government more responsive, agencies began to create
and rely on advisory committees, the use of which grew dramatically within the
Beltway after World War II and outside the Beltway during the 1980s. 288 Howev-
286. See David Faure, Note, The Federal Advisory Committee Act: Balanced Representation and
Open Meetings Conflict with Dispute Resolution, II OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 489, 490, 518 (1996)
(arguing that FACA, which subjects advisory committees to open meetings and public records re-
quirements under 5 U.S.C. § 552, interferes with the function of negotiated rulemaking and consensus-
building processes); see also LAURI D. BOXER-MACOMBER, CTR. FOR COLLABORATIVE POLICY, TOO
MUCH SUN? EMERGING CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL OPEN MEETING
LEGISLATION TO PUBLIC POLICY CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESSES (2003), available at
http://www.csus.edu/ccp/publicationsfToo_ MuchSun.pdf.
287. See INTERAGENCY ADR WORKING GROUP STEERING COMM., PROTECTING THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEEDINGS: A GUIDE FOR FEDERAL WORKPLACE ADR
PROGRAM ADMINISTRATORS (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/adr/pdf/final-confid.pdf.
288. For a comprehensive review of FACA that includes its history, case law to that date, and a
survey of agency administrators, see Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory
Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451 (1997). Those authors observe:
This is not to suggest, however, that agencies began to receive advice from nongovernmental ent-
ities only in 1972. Much to the contrary, the FACA was designed to formalize and routinize what
was already an age-old institution, in part out of concern that some interests had come to enjoy
unchecked and perhaps illicit access to federal executive decisionmakers. As a House report out-
lining the need for some kind of governance structure for advisory committees explained, for ex-
ample, the Antitrust Division in the early 1950s expressed concerns about the proximity of some
industry advisory committee members to the issues about which they were rendering advice,
concerns which led the Justice Department to issue a set of standards for agencies' use of advi-
sory groups. Meanwhile, the possibility of legislative standards for the organization and opera-
tion of advisory committees had been considered by Congress intermittently in the two decades
preceding the Act, with the earliest efforts of congressional control over "outsiders"' advice dat-
ing to 1842.
Id. at 453 (footnotes omitted).
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er, concerns arose about potential waste, their perceived excessive influence, and
the problem of delegating effective decisional authority to unelected, non-
accountable private parties. 289 The committees often met in private and they were
not always balanced among competing points of view. As a result, FACA was
adopted to force agencies to give notice of the creation of new advisory commit-
tees and to define the scope of their authority. It imposes on congressional com-
mittees the responsibility for supervising the formation of new committees in
legislation and requiring that the membership of the proposed advisory committee
is fair and balanced "in terms of the points of view represented." 290 It requires
that a federal official convene and attend each meeting, that meetings be open to
the public, and that there be an element of public participation. 291 This is an in-
stance of federal legal infrastructure that anticipates a collaborative network,
namely the committee, but again ties it to a single agency as defined in the APA
292
to preserve accountability. It also requires public records 293 and the availability of
public participation in committee meetings29 4 to ensure both transparency and
accountability. FACA specifically excludes local civic groups and bodies created
to advise state and local government.
295
289. For example, FACA provides:
(a) The Congress finds that there are numerous committees, boards, commissions, councils, and
similar groups which have been established to advise officers and agencies in the executive
branch of the Federal Government and that they are frequently a useful and beneficial means of
furnishing expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions to the Federal Government.
(b) The Congress further finds and declares that-
(1) the need for many existing advisory committees has not been adequately reviewed;
(2) new advisory committees should be established only when they are determined to be es-
sential and their number should be kept to the minimum necessary;
(3) advisory committees should be terminated when they are no longer carrying out the
purposes for which they were established;
(4) standards and uniform procedures should govern the establishment, operation, adminis-
tration, and duration of advisory committees;
(5) the Congress and the public should be kept informed with respect to the number, pur-
pose, membership, activities, and cost of advisory committees; and
(6) the function of advisory committees should be advisory only, and that all matters under
their consideration should be determined, in accordance with the law, by the official, agen-
cy, or officer involved.
5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 297-300
(Supp. 2006).
290. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2).
291. BOXER-MACOMBER, supra note 286, at 14.
292. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(3) provides: "The term 'agency' has the same meaning as in section 551(1) of
title 5, United States Code."
293. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 8(b)(2) and (3) provides that agency heads must designate an advisory commit-
tee management officer who is responsible for assembling and maintaining "the reports, records, and
other papers of any such committee during its existence" and also for carrying out "on behalf of that
agency, the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to such reports,
records, and other papers."
294. Id. Section 552(a) of Title 5 of the United States Code contains provisions for open meetings.
295. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 4(c) provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to apply to any local
civic group whose primary function is that of rendering a public service with respect to a Federal
program, or any State or local committee, council, board, commission, or similar group established to
advise or make recommendations to State or local officials or agencies."
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The primary purpose of FACA was to reduce the use of advisory committees,
296
and it succeeded in this goal. However, it may have succeeded at the expense
of effective policy-making according to some commentators, who observe the
inherent tension between policies favoring negotiation and consensus building and
FACA's goals of restricting the use of advisory committees.
297
4. The APA and Processes for Collaboration
In the 1980s, some federal agencies engaged in dispute resolution, negotiated
rulemaking, and policy-consensus processes without explicit authorization. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
among others, experimented with ADR for a decade or longer.29 8 Other agencies
declined to use these new techniques, asserting they were outside their delegated
authority.299  In its original form, the APA had no explicit provision for the
processes to be used in collaboration, e.g., ADR. It had no provision for negotiat-
ing or building consensus on regulations with networks of private, nonprofit, or
public organizations (negotiated rulemaking or policy consensus processes). In
the 1980s, agency lawyers had concerns that their clients had no authority under
the APA to use ADR or negotiated rulemaking and that agencies doing so might
be acting ultra vires or outside the scope of their delegation. 30 However, con-
cerns about making government more efficient and responsive to the public led to
legislative reform.
Congress passed two separate amendments to the APA in 1990301 (made per-
manent in 1996) to clear up the confusion. These were the NRA of 1996 and the
ADRA of 1996.302 These federal laws have no application to state government;
they apply only to agencies of the federal government as defined in the APA.
These two statutes substantially expanded the forms and opportunities for partici-
pation by citizens and stakeholders in federal government decision-making. Since
296. President William J. Clinton reported to Congress in 1998, in the twenty-seventh and final such
mandated report, on the reduction of advisory committees and their attendant costs during his adminis-
tration in keeping with this goal. TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON
ADVISORY COMMITTEES, FISCAL YEAR 1998, at 1(1999).
297. Croley & Funk, supra note 288, at 456 (describing President Clinton's efforts to encourage
negotiation and consensus building and how these are in tension with his goal of reducing by a third
the number of advisory committees).
298. See, e.g., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING INST., OFFICE OF COUNSEL AND THE INST. FOR WATER
RES., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PARTNERING, CONSENSUS BUILDING, AND ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: CURRENT USES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE U. S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERIES, WORKING PAPER NO. 8, at I (IWR Working Paper No.
96-ADR-WP-8, 1996), available at http://www.iwr.usace.army.millinsidelproductspub/iwrreports/96-
ADR-WP-8.pdf.
299. Tina Nabatchi, supra note 230, at 647.
300. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK 9 (Marshall J. Breger, et al. eds.,
2001) (citing an opinion of the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel).
301. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2006)); The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006)).
302. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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Congress passed these statutes, there has been dramatic growth in the use of new
governance processes in the federal government.
30 3
5. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act
The NRA was adopted to allow collaboration among a representative group
of organizations and stakeholders to craft draft regulations; it is a top-down, care-
fully structured statute that contains this form of collaborative public management
within express limits. An agency convenes a group of twenty-five or fewer stake-
holders to negotiate the text for subsequent public notice and comment.3" Con-
gress intended to enhance informal rulemaking and encourage innovation. The
NRA defines "consensus" as unanimous concurrence among represented interests,
unless the committee agrees otherwise. 30 5 A "negotiated rulemaking committee
[is] an advisory committee established by an agency ... to consider and discuss
issues for the purpose of reaching a consensus in the development of a proposed
rule." 3°6 It incorporates APA definitions for agency, party, person, rule, and rule-
making.
30 7
A single agency has sole authority to determine the need for a negotiated
rulemaking committee. 308 It may seek assistance from a "convener.'" 309 It must
consider the need for a rule, whether there is a limited number of identifiable in-
terests, whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a balanced committee (one that
can represent interests affected and is willing to negotiate), the likelihood of con-
sensus within a reasonable time, agency resources, and agency willingness to use
consensus for proposed rule.310 The agency must publish notice so people can
apply for membership on the committee. After thirty days, the agency may estab-
lish the committee. 311 It may also decide not to go forward with negotiated rule-
making but instead to use the conventional formal and informal rulemaking
process. Membership on the negotiated rulemaking committee is limited to twen-
ty-five persons unless the agency determines it needs more for balanced represen-
tation, and the committee must include at least one agency representative. 312 The
decision not to have a negotiated rulemaking committee is left to agency discre-
tion and not subject to judicial review. 313
Once established, the committee must meet and try to reach consensus and
may use an impartial facilitator to assist, chair meetings, and manage record-
303. See generally Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group, http://www.adr.gov/
index.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009); SENGER, supra note 89. For an early empirical study of agency
ADR use, see Bingham & Wise, supra note 89. For a follow up study with data collected in 2001, see
Tina Nabatchi, The Institutionalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Government,
67 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 646 (2007) (finding widespread use but uneven diffusion across agencies).
304. Cornelius M. Kerwin, Negotiated Rulemaking, in THE HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 225, 225-36 (Phillip J. Cooper & Chester A. Newland eds., 1997).
305. 5 U.S.C. § 562(2) (2006).
306. Id. § 562(7).
307. Id. §§ 562(1), (8)-(11).
308. See id. § 563(a).
309. Id. § 563(b).
310. Id. § 563(a).
311. See id. § 564.
312. Id. § 565(b).
313. Id. § 570.
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keeping.314  Records are exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Moreover, the
committee itself is exempt from those sections of the APA on rulemaking proce-
dures.
3 15
The NRA requires a public report if there is consensus and permits a limited
report if there is no consensus or a consensus on some but not all issues.3 16 The
committee terminates upon final rule unless there is some early agency directive
or committee agreement on a different termination date.3 17 There is judicial re-
view only of a final rule and then in the same manner and by the same standards
as any other rulemaking. The courts do not accord any greater deference to the
318product of negotiated rulemaking than rules made by the traditional process.
There is an active debate over whether negotiated rulemaking saves agencies
time and money. While some claim that negotiated rulemaking takes no less time
than traditional ones, 3 19 others argue that only rules likely to spur litigation and
controversy are submitted to negotiated rulemaking, and thus, many administra-
tors view it as an achievement that these rules take no longer to draft than tradi-
tional rulemaking. 320  Others have concerns about the accountability of public
agencies using negotiated rulemaking.321
Whatever its effectiveness, from the standpoint of collaborative public man-
agement, the NRA presents problems. First, it contemplates action within the
scope of delegated authority to a single lead agency. Although it permits that
agency to create the working group, it does not contemplate joint action by mul-
tiple agencies. Second, it sets up a tightly prescribed procedure for collaboration.
This is a top-down authorization that does not allow for much experimentation.
Third, it requires that a negotiated rulemaking committee terminate upon comple-
tion of a draft rule; thus it does not contemplate the participation of the committee
in implementation of the regulation. Fourth, it does not give the committee ex-
press authority for civic engagement during the conduct of its work. Finally, since
committees are subject to FACA,322 all the concerns expressed regarding that
323statute apply with equal force to the NRA.
314. Id. § 566.
315. Id.
316. Id. §566(f).
317. Id. § 567.
318. Id. § 570.
319. See Coglianese, supra note 206.
320. Harter, supra note 206, at 45-49.
321. Robert Choo notes:
Both negotiation theory and real-world experience point toward an insoluble tension between the
agency's traditional role as a sovereign entity entrusted with using its expertise to further the
public interest, and its role as negotiator seeking to attain a consensus with private parties. There-
fore, regardless of whether or not reg neg "works" in a practical sense, it raises serious questions
of the rule's legitimacy-questions which, if not rising to the level of unconstitutionality under
the nondelegation doctrine, certainly cast doubt on the wisdom and propriety of granting judicial
deference to negotiated interpretations of law.
Robert Choo, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaking: Should Chevron Deference Apply?, 52
RUTGERS L. REV. 1069, 1119-1120 (2000).
322. 5 U.S.C. § 562(7) ("negotiated rulemaking committee" as "an advisory committee established by
an agency in accordance with this subchapter and the Federal Advisory Committee Act to consider and
discuss issues for the purpose of reaching a consensus in the development of a proposed rule.").
323. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
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6. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
The ADRA contemplates both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial processes
when it authorizes agencies to use ADR.324 Quasi-legislative new governance
processes include uses of mediation, facilitation, consensus building, and colla-
borative policy-making to make, implement, and enforce policy.325  Under the
ADRA, agencies have made quasi-judicial uses of new governance processes
(including mediation, facilitation, mini-trials, summary jury trials, fact-finding,
and binding and non-binding arbitration) for disputes arising out of employment,
procurement contracts, or civil enforcement of an agency's public law mandate.
326
The ADRA contains four key structural components: (1) authorization to use
ADR; (2) a mandate that each agency appoint a dispute resolution specialist; (3)
required statements of agency ADR policy for the public; and (4) easing bureau-
cratic barriers to ADR use.327 These four elements have combined to increase the
use of ADR by federal agencies. Surprisingly, the ADRA accomplished this
without a federal monetary appropriation to support agency efforts to implement
programs.
The ADRA authorizes use of "alternative means of dispute resolution" de-
fined as "any procedure that is used to resolve issues in controversy, including,
but not limited to, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials,
arbitration, and use of ombuds, or any combination thereof., 328 In other words,
the statute creates an open-ended, not an exclusive, list of processes. This allows
for continuous innovation. The act does not define the terms for processes, which
in turn opens them up for innovation. The express authorization to use ADR elim-
inated any bar imposed by conservative and risk-averse agency legal counsel.
The ADRA expressly addressed concerns over the delegation of public au-
thority to a private person in the provision for binding arbitration. 3 9  The U.S.
Department of Justice raised concerns about excessive delegation in the first draft
of the bill, resulting in a watered down arbitration clause; the agency had the pow-
324. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK, supra note 300, at 36-37 (observ-
ing that it authorizes federal agencies to use any ADR procedure for a controversy related to an admin-
istrative program, which includes all federal agencies involving protection of the public interest and
the determination of rights, privileges and obligations of private parties).
325. For example, environmental policy. See ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED:
CHALLENGES, CHOICES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 177-182 (Robert F. Durant et al. eds., 2004); Thomas C.
Beierele and Jerry Cayford, Dispute Resolution as a Method of Public Participation, in THE PROMISE
AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 6 1, at 53-68.
326. Bingham & Wise, supra note 89, at 392-401.
327. Margaret Ward, Public Fuss in a Private Forum, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1997)
("[The ADRA] required each federal agency to adopt an ADR policy, appoint an ADR specialist,
develop an ADR training program .... review existing agency agreements for possible incorporation
of ADR clauses[,] . . .examine the potential for alternatives in relation to . . . formal and informal
adjudications, rulemakings, enforcement actions, license and permit issuance and revocation, contract
administration, and enforcement and defense of litigation.").
328. 5 U.S.C. § 571(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
329. See Jonathan D. Mester, Note, The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996: Will the New
Era of ADR in Federal Administrative Agencies Occur at the Expense of Public Accountability?, 13
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er to reject the award. 330 However, the 1996 version of the ADRA contains expli-
cit authorization for arbitration that is binding on both parties. It incorporates
provisions of The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) on enforcing arbitration
awards. 331 The ADRA gives arbitrators the usual powers to conduct a hearing,
administer oaths, subpoena witnesses, and issue awards. It also gives arbitrators
the power to "interpret and apply relevant statutory and regulatory requirements,
legal precedents, and policy directives." 332 Arbitrators must issue awards within
thirty days unless the parties agree to some other time limit. The ADRA specifies
the content of an arbitration award--specifically "a brief, informal discussion of
the factual and legal basis for the award"-but does not require that it be for-
mal.333 Final awards are binding and may be enforced under the FAA.334
The way in which Congress addressed the concern about delegation to private
decision-makers was by providing that an arbitration award, unlike agency adjudi-
cations, cannot be used as precedent. 335 Since they are not precedent, arbitration
awards may not be reviewed under the APA. Instead, there is judicial review only
under the standards of the FAA.336 This means that a court will only overturn a
binding award upon proof of fraud, collusion, undue influence, exceeding the
scope of the submission, or using unlawful procedure. 337 In contrast, the APA
standards authorize a reviewing court to overturn an agency's adjudication if it is
arbitrary and capricious, affected by an error of law, lacking substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, or unconstitutional.338 It is harder to overturn an arbitra-
tion award through judicial review than an agency's adjudication. A federal agen-
cy has complete discretion, not subject to judicial review, in deciding whether to
use ADR.
3 1
The ADRA provided new legal infrastructure to ease the bureaucratic barriers
to using neutrals. The ADRA authorizes agencies to use neutrals from a variety of
sources, including the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service roster, Ameri-
can Arbitration Association roster, or any individual.340 It authorizes agencies to
enter into contracts and establish compensation through agreement with other
parties to the dispute. 341 The statute also provides confidentiality for the parties
for dispute resolution communications between a neutral and a party, with certain
statutorily enumerated exceptions. 342 All of these had previously been barriers
that served agency inertia.
330. See Cynthia B. Dauber, The Ties That Do Not Bind: Nonbinding Arbitration in Federal Adminis-
trative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 165, 172-73 (1995).
331. 5 U.S.C. § 580.
332. Id. § 579(5).
333. Id. § 580(a).
334. See id. § 580(c).
335. Id. § 580(d).
336. See id. § 581(a).
337. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
338. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
339. See id. § 581(b).
340. See id. § 573(a) ("Neutrals"); Am. Arbitration Ass'n, http://www.adr.org/ (last visited Dec. 15,
2009); Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv., FMCS: Who We Are, http://www.fmcs.gov/intemet/
categoryList.asp?categoryD=- 13 (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
341. Id. § 573(e).
342. Id. § 574.
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Thus, the ADRA authorizes individual agencies to use the processes of colla-
boration. Impliedly, it authorizes them to participate in multi-stakeholder dispute
resolution processes with other agencies. However, it is not expressly directed at
action by a network nor does it address issues of civic engagement. It contem-
plates a convener agency and action in relation to specific and identified stake-
holders. Thus, it does not serve as the necessary legal infrastructure for collabora-
tive governance.
However, the ADRA is increasingly viewed as a success. It may serve as a
model for legislation on collaborative public management and collaborative go-
vernance, including broader institutionalization of civic engagement and delibera-
tive democracy processes.
7. E-Government Act
The E-Government Act of 2002343 brought the federal government into the
Internet age by requiring use of new technologies to make government more ac-
cessible and transparent to the public. 344 Unlike many other administrative laws,
it makes express reference to collaboration and dialogue "among Federal, State,
local, and tribal government leaders on electronic Government in the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches, as well as leaders in the private and nonprofit
sectors, to encourage collaboration. . .. "345 There is growing scholarship on the
potential for expanded participation and collaboration in governance through the
use of online tools. 346 However, the E-Government Act is framed largely in terms
of information transparency and access, not public participation.
8. Specific Authorizations to Individual Agencies
Congress may authorize individual agencies to use new governance processes
or collaborate in service delivery in specific policy arenas. Individual federal
agencies may be authorized, or sometimes required, to use ADR processes for
certain kinds of disputes or within certain programs for enforcing public law.
Special purpose authorizations in labor relations have existed for most of the past
century; labor-management cooperation programs are more recent. However, in
the past two decades, Congress has built express authority to use ADR into a wide
variety of public law programs, including U.S. Department of Agriculture media-
343. 44 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
344. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 265, at 469-472.
345. 44 U.S.C. § 3602(f)(9)(A).
346. Stephen J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The Contours of Public Participation
in Agency Rulemaking, J.L. POL'Y FOR INFO. SoC'Y 59 (2005) (reporting on empirical study of all
forms of participation through an analysis of online documents of the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion); A. Michael Froomkin, Building the Bottom Up from the Top Down, 5 uS: J. L. & POL'Y FOR
INFO. SOCY 141 (2009) (arguing that government can foster self-organization through legal reform to
make communication technologies inexpensive, reliable, and widely available); Beth Simone Noveck,
Designing Deliberative Democracy in Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber Lawyer, 9 B.UJ. SCI. &
TECH. L. 1 (2003)(arguing for broader use of technology in participatory democracy); Beth Simone
Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433 (2004) (arguing for strengthen-
ing technology to foster citizen participation). But see Cary Coglianese, supra note 215 (arguing that
empirical evidence does not support expanded public participation through e-rulemaking).
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tion of disputes between the government and farmers over federal agricultural
loans;347 Environmental Protection Agency mediation and arbitration for certain
disputes; 348 mediation of special education disputes; 349 and Department of Defense
procurement disputes in a variety of forms, including mediation and a form of
advisory arbitration known as dispute panels. 350 These are but a few such special
purpose authorizations. By definition, special purpose authorizations generally
run to a single agency; they do not contemplate a network of agencies.
More commonly, mandates for public involvement or public participation
programs exist in most agencies' enabling legislation and are too numerous to
catalogue. However, these typically do not define public involvement or public
participation or authorize the more innovative processes of dialogue, deliberation,
or large scale experiments in deliberative democracy.
9. The U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution
Another model for legal infrastructure is the creation of the U.S. Institute for
Environmental Conflict Resolution (USIECR).35' This relatively young federal
agency, established within the Morris Udall Foundation, has as its express mission
"to assist the Federal Government in implementing section 4331 of Title 42 [sec-
tion 101 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969] by providing assess-
ment, mediation, and other related services to resolve environmental disputes
involving agencies and instrumentalities of the United States." 352 Its mission is to
provide a process and mechanism for collaboration across federal, state, local, and
Native American sovereign entities for environmental disputes. This work of
necessity involves a broader array of non-governmental stakeholders from both
private and nonprofit sectors, as well as the broader public through direct citizen
participation. By authorizing the USIECR to serve a convening function, the sta-
tute indirectly authorizes agencies to participate, and thus to collaborate.
347. See generally Stephen Carpenter, Farm Service Agency Credit Programs and USDA National
Appeals Division, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 35 (1998); L. Roger Johnson, The North Dakota Agricultural
Mediation Service, 70 N.D. L. REV. 295 (1994); Bethany Verhoef Brands et al., Contemporary Studies
Project, The Iowa Mediation Service: An Empirical Study of Iowa Attorneys' Views on Mandatory
Farm Mediation, 79 IOWA L. REV. 653 (1994).
348. See generally Sarah B. Belter, The Use of Arbitration by Federal Agencies to Solve Environmen-
tal Disputes: All Wrapped Up in Red Tape, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1041-42 (2002) (observing that
the Environmental Protection Agency has used mediation and arbitration to solve environmental dis-
putes since the 1980s under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, and the
Comprehensive Environmental Compensation, Response, and Liability Act of 1980).
349. See generally Grace E. D'Alo, Accountability In Special Education Mediation: Many a Slip
'Twixt Vision and Practice?, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 201 (2003); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back
Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Media-
tion and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573 (2004).
350. See generally Eldon H. Crowell and Charles Pou, Jr., Appealing Government Contract Deci-
sions: Reducing the Cost and Delay of Procurement Litigation with Alternative Dispute Resolution
Techniques, 49 MD. L. REV. 183 (1990).
351. See U.S. Inst. for Envtl. Conflict Resolution, http:llwww.ecr.govl (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
352. 20 U.S.C. § 5604 (2006).
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B. State Legal Infrastructure
Consistent with our federalism, the APA and its amendments have no appli-
cation to state or local agencies. Each state adopts its own framework for state
administrative procedure and for public conflict resolution. However, many states
look to both the federal government and other states for guidance.
1. The Model State Administrative Procedures Act
In a model similar to federal law, state administrative procedures acts gener-
ally contemplate action by a single agency, not an agency engaged in a collabora-
tive public management network. The United States is blessed with the public
service of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
3 53
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) is itself silent on ADR
and negotiated rulemaking. 354 However, in states that have adopted it, administra-
tors usually have implicit authority to use these processes through their power to
enter into contracts. Moreover, most states adopt the MSAPA's general provi-
sions authorizing informal disposition or settlement of cases (section 1-106), al-
lowing agencies to establish advisory committees (section 3-101), and requiring
agencies to adopt rules for informal procedures available to the public (section 2-
104). All of these provisions provide authority for the kinds of informal, con-
sensus-oriented processes that characterize the new governance.
In the absence of express statutory authorization, binding arbitration may
raise concerns about unconstitutional delegation of agency regulatory power to
private decision-makers. 356 However, generally none of the other new governance
processes pose this problem because they are all predicated upon agency agree-
ment to the process and to any binding outcome. Moreover, as long as agencies
subsequently follow other, more formal procedures for notice and comment to
adopt negotiated draft regulations, there is no inherent conflict between traditional
rulemaking and negotiated rulemaking even in the absence of express statutory
authority.
However, this legal infrastructure presumes that the final agency action will
be taken by one agency acting alone, not as part of a network. The drafters simply
did not envision the emergence of networked governance.
2. State Legal Infrastructure for Negotiation and Dispute Resolution
As is the case in the federal sector, there is legal infrastructure in many states
that authorizes public agencies to use the processes of collaboration, for example,
mediation. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
353. These scholars and elite practitioners craft model statutes on a wide variety of subjects for states
to consider enacting. See The Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws,
http://www.nccusl.org (last visited June 19, 2009).
354. 1981 Model State Admin. Procedure Act, available at http://www.nmcpr.state.nm.us/acr/
presentations/198 1 MSAPA.htm.
355. Id.
356. SENGER, supra note 89, at 41-43.
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recently completed work on the new Uniform Mediation Act.35 7 This is another
model statute for state legislatures to consider adopting. It provides express au-
thority for government use of mediation in section 2(6). A number of states have
already adopted this uniform act, such as Illinois.
Many states expressly authorize all state agencies to use new governance
processes, either through amendments to their state APAs or executive order.358
As of this writing, there are six comprehensive state offices of dispute resolution,
thirty-eight offices focusing on courts, and thirty-four in universities and non-
profits. 3 9 State legislation on ADR and negotiated rulemaking ranges from the
short and broad to the long and specific. For example, New Mexico simply autho-
rizes agencies to use ADR. 360 In contrast, Texas 361 and Florida362 have legislation
analogous to the federal ADRA and NRA. More common is a general authoriza-
tion as part of a state administrative procedure act. Indiana authorizes state agen-
cies to use mediation, provided mediators have the same training as mediators for
state courts.3 63 New Jersey adopted dispute resolution and negotiated rulemaking
through the attorney general's power to adopt additional administrative proce-
dures, and these provisions appear in the state administrative code.3 64 Again, all
of these statutes authorize the processes for collaboration (mediation, facilitation,
and negotiation), but they are drafted from the perspective of unitary agency ac-
tion. A single agency can enter into a process, but the ultimate action is its re-
sponsibility, not that of the collaborative.
In addition to these general authorizations, there are myriad specific legisla-
tive authorizations for certain state agencies to use particular processes for certain
substantive policy work. For example, mediation is a common method for ad-
dressing conflicts arising out of special education placements and programs at the
state level.365 State environmental agencies may have the power to use mediation
for particular land use disputes, like deciding upon the sites for landfills. 3 66 In
357. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIF. MEDIATION ACT
(amended 2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf.
358. See Policy Consensus Initiative & Nat'l Policy Consensus Ctr http://www.policyconsensus.org/
tools/executiveorders/index.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2009) (describing executive orders in Alabama,
Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah).
359. See Policy Consensus Initiative & Nat'l Policy Consensus Ctr., Directory of Programs,
http://www.policyconsensus.org/directory/alldirectory.php (last visited June 19, 2009).
360. N.M. Stat. §§ 12-8A-1-12-8A-8 (West, Westlaw current through 2009 2d. Sess.). The New
Mexico Governmental Dispute Prevention and Resolution Act authorizes state agencies to use a broad
range of processes in rulemaking and adjudication.
361. Texas statutes are modeled on the federal statutes. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 2008.001-2008.058
(West, Westlaw current 2009 Reg. and 1 st Called Sess. of the 81 st Leg.) (negotiated rulemaking); TEX.
GOV'T CODE §§ 2009.001-2009.055 (West, Westlaw current 2009 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of the
81 st Leg.) (government dispute resolution).
362. FLA. STAT. § 120.573 (West, Westlaw current through Ch. 2009-270) (authorizing mediation);
FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (authorizing negotiated rulemaking).
363. See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3.5-1 (West, Westlaw current through end of 2009 1st Spec.
Sess.).
364. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1:30-1.2, 1:30-5.7 (West, Westlaw current through Jan. 4, 2010).
365. See Center for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Education,
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre (last visited Dec. 15 2009).
366. See. e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 40A, § 6 (West, Westlaw current through Ch. 202 of the 2009
1st Annual Sess.); see generally, INST. FOR ENVTL. NEGOTIATION, UNIV. OF VA., A STREAM
CORRIDOR PROTECTION STRATEGY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2002), available at
http://www.virginia.eduiendocs/stream%20guide.final.pdf%202; see generally, POLICY CONSENSUS
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environmental governance, a group of agencies and stakeholders may reach an
agreement through a consensus-building process, but sometimes problems can
arise with enforcing and implementing the agreement. This too reflects a weak-
ness in legal infrastructure for collaboration.
C. Legal Infrastructure for Local Government
Although the legal framework for local government is in the first instance a
matter of state law, local government charters and ordinances can provide an im-
portant source of support and legal infrastructure for collaborative governance and
particularly civic engagement at the level of government that people find most
relevant to their daily lives. 367 For example, the Los Angeles Neighborhood
Councils are incorporated into the city charter.
368
The National Civic League has developed an appendix to its Model City
Charter that is titled "Citizen-Based Government: A Process to Engage Citizens in
Charter Revision. 369 One could envision a charter provision that creates an office
of collaborative governance and authorizes departments, boards, and commissions
to make broad and innovative use of civic engagement processes for dialogue and
deliberation.
VI. NEW LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR ENCOURAGING COLLABORATIVE
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
While the existing legal framework authorizes some of the processes for col-
laboration, these statutes were all drafted from the perspective of unitary agency
decision-making. Moreover, they were not drafted with broad civic engagement
and collaborative governance in mind. The inherent caution of lawyers may re-
quire more explicit language enabling agencies to do this work. There is much
experimentation in forms of networked governance; similarly, we are in the "let
the thousand flowers bloom" stage of collaborative governance, in which new
processes for citizen dialogue and deliberation in the policy process are emerging
daily. Legal infrastructure should not inhibit this experimentation; instead, it
should authorize and legitimize it.
There are five key questions that the field of administrative law must consider
as it develops new legal infrastructure for collaborative governance:
INITIATIVE, STATES MEDIATING CHANGE: IMPROVING GOVERNANCE THROUGH COLLABORATION
(2001), available at http://www.policyconsensus.org/publications/reports/docs/
MediatingChangeCollaboration.pdf.
367. See LEIGHNINGER, supra note 29, at 233-236 (2006). For resources and publications regarding
collaborative governance at the local government level, see the Institute for Local Government,
http://www.ca-ilg.org (follow "civic engagement" link for the Collaborative Governance Initiative),
and the National League of Cities Democratic Governance Panel, http://www.nlc.org (follow "gover-
nance & structure" link to find civic engagement resources).
368. See, e.g., Division 22 of the Los Angeles Administrative Code. Chapter 28 establishes the De-
partment of Neighborhood Empowerment to supervise a system of neighborhood councils. Id., availa-
ble at http://www.lacityneighborhoods.com/Documents/CharterOrdinance.pdf (last accessed Dec. 15,
2009).
369. NAT'L CIVIC LEAGUE, MODEL CITY CHARTER: DEFINING GOOD GOVERNMENT IN A NEW
MILLENNIUM (8th ed. 2003).
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1. How can we empower agencies to participate in networks that can
take action consistent with notions of delegated authority constrained
by legislative standards that courts can use in judicial review?
2. How do we facilitate collaborative public management in a way that
is consistent with transparency in government?
3. How do we foster effective participation in collaborative governance
by citizens and stakeholders to provide greater transparency?
4. How do we foster broader civic engagement in public management
networks?
5. What forms and methods of accountability are appropriate in colla-
boration?
There are a variety of approaches we can begin to consider to address the le-
gal infrastructure problem. One can envision a model analogous to a hybrid of the
ADRA and NRA. In the area of collaborative public management, like the
ADRA, it could provide the broad bottom-up authorization for agencies to devel-
op many different collaboration public management structures. It could clarify
that agencies are empowered to act collectively, without violating the scope of
their respective delegations. It could clarify that they have broad authority to
innovate and experiment with ways to engage the public, without becoming sub-
ject to charges of waste or abuse. At the same time, like the NRA, it could pro-
vide guidance on what criteria an agency might consider when deciding to use
such a collaborative public management structure, much like the NRA criteria to
assist an agency in deciding to use negotiated rulemaking. An agency's decision
on whether or not to collaborate could, like the decision to use ADR or negotiated
rulemaking, be committed to agency discretion. An essential element to foster
both transparency and accountability would be to expand public participation and
make it effective.
In the area of upstream collaborative governance processes, it could authorize
broader agency use and innovation with civic engagement processes for dialogue
and deliberation. Involving the public through more collaborative governance
would make the work of collaborative public networks visible and directly ac-
countable in a way that is far more immediate than judicial review. In order to
foster continued growth in new processes for dialogue and deliberation, the statute
could contain a broad authorization for agencies to use a nonexclusive list of ex-
isting models including those catalogued here, much like the list in the ADRA of
forms of dispute resolution. Similar to the ADRA, it could require that agencies
develop capacity in this area by designating a specialist in collaborative gover-
nance. The ADRA did not cost money, but an appropriation would have made
diffusion of this innovation move faster through government.
These models do not represent mandates or provisions that would require a
specific collaborative public management structure or collaborative governance
process; history suggests that administrative law has evolved incrementally
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through delegations of authority to administrative agencies to adapt process to
their specific culture and substantive mandate.37 ° Instead, these suggestions take
the form of discretionary authority, incentives, and ideally financial support for
the many experiments that are already under way.
This is only an initial foray into an analysis of the legal framework for colla-
borative governance, and one that has focused primarily on these issues as they
apply to executive branch agencies in federal, and by analogy state, government.
There are also concerns about collaborative governance in the legislative 371 and
judicial372 branches. Agency counsel will be taking much closer looks at the laws
pertaining to their specific area of jurisdiction, and there are many far more pre-
cise legal problems they will no doubt articulate. The business of identifying all
of these specific issues can be costly for agencies. A more holistic approach may
be in the public interest-one that authorizes collaboration and preserves accoun-
tability through the enhanced transparency that broader civic engagement and
public participation afford.
370. See Sidney Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L. AM. U. 89 (1996).
371. See Tom Melling, Dispute Resolution Within Legislative Institutions, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1677
(1994).
372. See William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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